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WORSE THAN THE TOWER OF BABEL? REMEDYING 
ANTITRUST’S FALSE DICHOTOMY THROUGH  




Modern antitrust analysis rests on a strange perch. Its paradigmatic 
method—pretentiously entitled the Rule of Reason—appears (but only ap-
pears) to be a dichotomous analytic. At the first stage, a court supposedly 
defines the relevant market and determines, as a matter of fact, whether 
marketplace forces constrain the defendant from profitably raising price 
above the level that would prevail in a competitive market. Only when mar-
ket forces are inadequate to protect consumers, that is, the defendant has 
market power, does the court proceed to stage two, at which it assesses, as 
a matter of law, whether the defendant used its power improperly.  
Nothing approaching this dichotomous analytic paradigm is true. The 
ostensibly separate inquiries into market power and competitive effects 
are really a unitary assessment of the industry’s best competitive makeup, 
that is the allocation of business realms into those requiring rivalry and 
those in which cooperation or foreclosure are permitted. For example, 
rivalry is usually required in the realm of short-run price competition. But 
in some cases, such as when a firm holds a valuable patent, courts permit 
foreclosure in that short-term realm in order to foster competition to inno-
vate new products over the longer term. 
Although the “competitive makeup” term of art is foreign to the antitrust 
vocabulary, it captures actual antitrust practice in the courts. Everybody 
knows that pure competition is a fiction; all industries involve an amalgam of 
                                                                                                                         
 Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. In the 1990s, the author was a 
trial attorney with the United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division. The views 
expressed in this Article are entirely those of the author. The author thanks Deven Desai 
and Chris Guzelian for their helpful discussions relating to the thesis of this Article and 
especially Chris for suggesting the connection between Austrian economics and the 
competitive makeup approach to antitrust law. 
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competitive, cooperative, and foreclosed realms. And antitrust law requires 
competition only where it serves consumer interests. 
Although many experts question whether federal judges can effectively 
assess business conduct as the competitive makeup approach requires, 
Austrian economics provides a theoretical justification for concluding that 
thoughtful judges can do a better job of resolving antitrust cases than 
would mindless, automaton courts applying necessarily over- and under-
inclusive bright-line prophylactic rules. Most importantly, the Supreme 
Court has to date, including its most recent 2013 decision, demanded that 
federal judges engage theory and make thoughtful antitrust decisions. 
Although much of this Article is interpretive, attempting to explain 
what courts actually do when they say they are applying the antitrust di-
chotomy, it recognizes a significant problem that requires a remedy. Trial 
judges have the power to dictate the level of scrutiny that appellate courts 
will apply to their decisions. The false dichotomy can be manipulated so 
that most decisions can be framed as either issues of market definition, 
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, or competitive effect, 
reviewed de novo. Given the complexity and social import of many anti-
trust cases, a single federal judge should not have this power. 
Appellate courts should thus abandon the clearly erroneous standard 
of review for market definition. The Supreme Court requires independent 
appellate scrutiny of fact-findings controlling important issues of public 
policy that are indistinguishable from the antitrust laws. It would thus be a 
small, but important, step to impose a de novo review standard for all 
antitrust issues.  
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INTRODUCTION 
There’s something happening and you don’t know what it is, do you, 
Mr. Jones? 
—BOB DYLAN, Ballad of a Thin Man1 
Everybody knows that the dice are loaded, everybody rolls with their 
fingers crossed ... that’s how it goes, and everybody knows. 
—LEONARD COHEN, Everybody Knows2 
Modern antitrust analysis rests on a strange perch. Its paradigmatic 
method—pretentiously entitled the “Rule of Reason”3—appears (but only 
appears) to be a dichotomous analytic. At the first stage of the analysis, a 
court supposedly defines the relevant market and determines, as a matter of 
fact, whether market forces constrain the defendant from profitably raising 
price above the level that would prevail in a competitive market. Only when 
market forces are inadequate to protect consumers—that is, the defendant 
has market power4—does the court proceed to stage two where it assesses, 
as a matter of law, whether the defendant used its power improperly.5 
In a 2011 article, Harvard Law School Professor Louis Kaplow de-
scribed this paradigm as “worse than ... the Tower of Babel.”6 Workers con-
structing the tower, he wrote, were “[a]t least ... aware that their utterances 
were mutually incomprehensible.”7 When it comes to antitrust, “everyone 
                                                                                                                         
1 BOB DYLAN, Ballad of a Thin Man, on HIGHWAY 61 REVISITED (Columbia Records 1965). 
2 LEONARD COHEN, Everybody Knows, on I’M YOUR MAN (Columbia Records 1988). 
3 In a small group of cases involving naked horizontal agreements not to compete, an-
titrust liability is imposed without reference to market power. See infra Part IV.F.4.a. 
4 See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984) 
(noting that “[m]arket power is the ability to raise prices above those that would be 
charged in a competitive market”). 
5 Although, in generic discussion, competitive effects are often expressed in terms of 
objective price increases, in actual cases these effects take a variety of different forms. 
For example, neither of the two significant antitrust trials of the late 1990s focused on 
price increases. Instead, both focused on the effects of practices designed to undermine 
potential or existing competitors. See generally Microsoft v. United States, 253 F.3d 34, 
50 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 340–42 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).  
6 Louis Kaplow, Market Share Thresholds: On the Conflation of Empirical Assess-
ments and Legal Policy Judgments, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 243, 264 (2011).  
7 Id. 
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seems to write and speak as if others have a common understanding.”8 But, 
according to Kaplow, they do not: the judges’ and lawyers’ unarticulated 
intuitions and assumptions are as vital to their decisions as they are inaccessi-
ble to each other.9 Kaplow effectively concluded that “[s]omething is hap-
pening” in antitrust cases, but the participants, like Bob Dylan’s thin man, 
“don’t know what it is.”10 
Kaplow’s critique is both dead on and largely irrelevant. He correctly por-
trays the rhetoric at stage one of the antitrust dichotomy as hollow and inade-
quate for its intended purpose of assessing whether the defendant possesses 
market power.11 But the “Tower of Babel” analogy is wrong; no one uses that 
rhetoric in the literal fashion that Kaplow criticizes. It serves as a framework 
through which lawyers and judges assess the consumer impact of challenged 
conduct after taking into account all of the available information. “That’s how 
it goes,” in Leonard Cohen’s words, and “everybody knows.”12 While the 
process would likely improve if everyone spoke openly about their reasoning 
processes, current practice is hardly babble; and uprooting it, at least too 
quickly, could wreak unnecessary havoc.13 
                                                                                                                         
8 Id. 
9 Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 465–66 
(2010). Kaplow contends: 
[I]t is remarkable that the criterion by which one market definition is 
deemed superior to another has received little direct attention and anal-
ysis. That is, there is no canonical operational statement of the standard 
for determining what constitutes a relevant market and, a fortiori, no de-
veloped underlying rationalization for whatever the principle might be. 
Id. Kaplow was not the first to criticize market definition. See Richard S. Markovits, The Limits 
to Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to Professor Easterbrook, 63 TEX. L. REV. 41, 58 (1984). 
10 DYLAN, supra note 1.  
11 Kaplow, supra note 9, at 440 (arguing that “the market definition process should be 
abandoned” because “the entire rationale for [it] is to enable an inference about market 
power” but “there does not exist any coherent way to choose a relevant market without 
first formulating one’s best assessment of market power”). 
12 COHEN, supra note 2 (“Everybody knows that the dice are loaded / Everybody rolls 
with their fingers crossed ... / That’s how it goes, everybody knows”). 
13 The traditional market definition process may provide an essential framework for 
determining whether particular conduct has an anticompetitive effect. In developing the 
1982 merger guidelines, the then-Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division, 
and respected antitrust commentator, William Baxter explained in the text of the guide-
lines that they intentionally divided and simplified the inquiry. Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division, Symposium, 1982 Merger Guidelines, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 649, 650 
(1982). “[I]n theory,” he wrote, “all the demand and supply forces relevant to the evaluation 
of a merger could be incorporated in the definition of a market.” Id. 
But Baxter recognized that despite its theoretic purity, an all-encompassing concept of 
the market would be difficult to apply. Thirty years later, long-time Antitrust Division 
economist, Greg Werden, defended Baxter’s reasoning in response to Kaplow’s critique. 
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The gulf between rhetoric and reality, however, is far from innocuous. 
The antitrust dichotomy between market power and competitive effects is 
descriptively false. The Supreme Court has required trial judges to assess 
antitrust defendants’ entrepreneurial decision-making to determine wheth-
er it comports with the competitive norms set by the antitrust laws.14 The 
ostensibly separate inquiries into market power and competitive effects are 
really a unitary process through which the court determines an industry’s 
best competitive makeup.15 Every industry is made up of realms in which 
firms could compete, including the realms of pricing, quality, geographic 
scope, innovation, interaction with competitors, suppliers or dealers, and 
product choice. Although antitrust generally requires competition to regu-
late market behavior, the Court has long recognized that the law permits 
cooperation or even foreclosure in some realms in order to enable rivalry 
to better serve consumer interests in others.16 An industry’s optimal com-
petitive makeup requires rivalry between firms only when it efficiently 
serves consumer interests. 
The critical question for an antitrust court is thus: should rivalry be re-
quired within the realm in which the defendant restrained competition? In 
answering this question, the existing false rhetoric of dichotomy permits a 
trial judge to choose, pretty much willy-nilly, the level of scrutiny that an 
appellate court will apply to its decision.17 The district court has this power 
because the unitary nature of the court’s true analysis can usually be manipu-
lated to rest on either stage of the false dichotomy. And therein lies the rub. If 
the court chooses to decide the case based on market power, it is reviewed 
                                                                                                                         
“The presentation of an antitrust case,” Werden wrote, “is a narrative about actual or 
likely competitive effects consisting of the actors, the scene, and the action—i.e., compe-
tition and the challenged conduct. Decades of experience suggests that market delineation 
often adds clarity and power to the narrative” of many (although certainly not all) anti-
trust cases. Gregory J. Werden, Why (Ever) Define Markets? An Answer to Professor 
Kaplow, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 729, 740 (2013). He also recognized that “the tools of mod-
ern economics do not always provide a satisfactory means for assessing the likely com-
petitive effects of a merger without resort to market delineation.” Id. When they do not, 
the relevant market remains important to the substantive analysis. Even Kaplow recog-
nized that talking about markets can assist a trial judge. Louis Kaplow, Market Definition 
and The Merger Guidelines, R. INDUS. ORG., Aug. 2011, at 107, 110 n.9 (acknowledging 
that “a market metaphor might not sometimes be helpful”). 
14 The Supreme Court’s case law recognizes that antitrust does not compel competi-
tion in all realms. See infra Part IV.F. 
15 Although prior work has strongly criticized market definition, this is the first article 
to show it is inseparable from the consideration of competitive effects. 
16 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984). 
17 See infra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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under the deferential clearly erroneous standard.18 But if the trial judge de-
cides to analyze competitive effects, the appellate court will review the deci-
sion de novo.19 
Antitrust analysis in the federal district courts is not the wasteland 
Kaplow makes it out to be. Most judges do excellent work, but the com-
plexity of many antitrust cases ensures that errors are inevitable, and the 
cases’ widespread economic impact counsels against tolerating those mis-
takes. As the second Justice Harlan wrote in another context, labeling a 
matter of significant public importance a fact-finding subject to deferential 
review “obscure[s] the peculiar responsibilities resting on state and federal 
courts ... and encourage[s] them to rely on easy labeling and jury verdicts 
as a substitute for facing up to the tough individual problems ... involved 
in every ... case.”20 
This very real problem with antitrust analysis can be cured with a single 
doctrinal change. Appellate courts should scrutinize all antitrust liability 
questions de novo regardless of whether the district court bases its decision 
on market power or competitive effects. Following Justice Harlan’s advice, 
the federal appellate courts aggressively review many fact-intensive ques-
tions involving complex and socially important issues.21 Antitrust cases fit 
well within this framework and should be subject to similar scrutiny. 
Part I reviews the traditional dichotomy in antitrust analysis between 
market structure and competitive effects. Part II explains that the most 
recent merger guidelines promulgated jointly by the federal antitrust en-
forcement agencies have begun to question this dichotomy. Part III distin-
guishes Kaplow’s polemic against market definition from the critique 
offered here. Kaplow accepts the traditional two-step paradigm, rejecting 
                                                                                                                         
18 Under the clearly erroneous standard, the reviewing court will not disturb a district 
court’s decision unless after reviewing all of the evidence the reviewing court “is left 
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States 
v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); see, e.g., Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 
182, 193 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying clearly erroneous standard), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1426 
(2013); Microsoft v. United States, 253 F.3d 34, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining that “[t]he definition 
of the relevant market is essentially a factual question,” and “[a]s long as the district 
court’s findings are plausible, we may not reverse the district court even if we would 
have decided the case differently”); Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. ITEK Corp., 717 
F.2d 1560, 1569 (11th Cir. 1983) (explaining that the “relevant product and geographic 
market is a question of fact, and findings concerning the market should be overturned on 
appeal only if clearly erroneous or where there is no evidence to support the finding”). 
19 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 50. 
20 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 498 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in result in 
part and dissenting in part). 
21 See infra Part VI.B. 
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only the process that courts ostensibly use at stage one.22 Part IV shows 
the dichotomy is false at its core and presents the descriptive thesis that 
traditional antitrust inquiries into market power and competitive effects 
are inseparable. A court determines the ideal competitive makeup of the 
industry and punishes firms that thwart competition in realms where it 
would serve consumer interests. Part V responds to anticipated criticism, 
showing that structure and effects are logically intertwined and that lower 
courts appearing to follow the antitrust dichotomy are tacitly determining 
the industry’s best competitive makeup. Part VI articulates and justifies 
the prescriptive thesis that appellate courts should review all antitrust 
decisions de novo. It shows courts have long applied probing scrutiny to 
similarly fact-intensive issues under constitutional and statutory regimes 
that resemble the antitrust laws in all meaningful ways. 
I. ANTITRUST’S FALSE DICHOTOMY 
A. The Modern Market Power-Competitive Effects Dichotomy 
The paradigm of modern antitrust analysis is a two-stage analytic di-
chotomy. At the first stage, the court ostensibly determines if the defend-
ant has the ability to overcome the marketplace forces that stimulate com-
petition and typically protect consumer interests, an ability commonly 
known as market power.23 After completing its first inquiry, the court is 
said to move to the second stage, at which it examines competitive effects, 
that is the impact of the defendant’s conduct on consumers.24 
1. Stage One—Market Power 
At stage one, a court supposedly identifies the competing products that 
satisfy consumer demand in order to define the market, calculate the com-
petitors’ shares, and estimate the likelihood of competitive entry and sup-
ply substitution.25 A relevant market is an observable cluster of economic 
activity—a set of reasonable substitute products or services from which 
                                                                                                                         
22 Kaplow, supra note 9, at 441. 
23 See infra notes 25–43 and accompanying text. 
24 Id. 
25 “Competitive entry” is a term reserved for entirely new participants in the market, 
and supply substitution refers to the ability of companies already making related products 
to shift their production to compete with the product in question. For example, in the 
standard-52-card-deck playing-card market, a competitive entrant would have no prior 
experience making cards, while supply substitution would occur if the manufacturer of 
Old Maid cards switched to 52-card decks. 
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consumers choose.26 The inquiry is simple in theory, asking whether con-
sumers substitute one product for another, thereby reciprocally incentiviz-
ing each producer to strive to make its own good more valuable. Also, it is 
presumed that a court can answer this question simply by finding facts 
about the market.27 
The firm’s market share is thought to be a vital predictor of whether it has 
market power, that is, the ability to raise price profitably to the detriment of 
consumers.28 If the defendants’ shares are large, the court may infer power.29 
Other evidence, such as the likelihood of competitive entry or supply substi-
tution, may undermine that inference.30 Within the paradigm, the market-
defining trial judge is thought to work much like a medical technician reading 
an x-ray, examining the parameters of a market for imperfections. The defect 
                                                                                                                         
26 See Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 252 (1958). 
27 Microsoft v. United States, 253 F.3d 34, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining that “the 
determination of a relevant market is a factual question to be resolved by the District 
Court”). In the Du Pont case, for example, the Supreme Court held it could not overturn a 
lower court’s relevant market finding unless the lower court applied “erroneous legal 
tests ... to essential findings of fact or that the findings themselves were ‘clearly errone-
ous’” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). United States v. E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 381 (1956) (“We do not try the facts of cases de novo.”). 
This approach was formalized in William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market 
Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 939 (1981) (explaining that “[t]he 
concept of market power as the setting of price in excess of marginal cost is formalized in 
the ‘Lerner index,’ which measures the proportional deviation of price at the firm’s 
profit-maximizing output from the firm’s marginal cost at that output”). 
28 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 17 (1984) (tying case); 
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (monopolization case); Times-
Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611–13 (1953) (tying case); 
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 50 (monopolization and tying); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 3.1, at 79 (3d ed. 
2005) (defining market power as the defendant’s ability to “make more money by selling 
its output at a higher-than-competitive price”). For ease of exposition, market power is 
normally expressed in terms of profitably raising price. However, it can include any sort 
of conduct that burdens consumers at the expense of the defendant firm as compared to 
the situation that would prevail in a competitive market. HOVENKAMP, supra at 79 & 79 
n.2. For example, market power could be exercised through lower quality, reduced 
choice, or delayed innovation in addition to higher prices. 
29 Herbert Hovenkamp has argued that in predatory pricing and foreclosure cases the 
defendant’s market share may be directly at issue and not merely relevant because of its 
correlation to market power. HOVENKAMP, supra note 28 § 3.1c, at 82–83. 
30 LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN 
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK ¶ 2.6b3, at 68–70 (2006) (explaining that after calculating market 
shares a court must assess barriers to entry because “[i]f firms outside the market could easily 
enter the market, a high market share may not reflect a great deal of market power”). 
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is either there or not, as a matter of fact, and appellate review is limited to de-
termining whether the lower court’s findings are clearly erroneous.31 
2. Stage Two—Consumer Harm 
The objective, structural analysis of stage one is thought to be analyti-
cally distinct from the second stage of the dichotomy during which the 
court determines whether the defendant’s conduct harmed consumers.32 At 
this stage, the court becomes a policy analyst, sifting through subtle and 
contestable economic considerations. Most market conduct has both pro- 
and anti-competitive effects; certain aspects can further the interests of 
consumers, other aspects may make them worse off. These competing 
effects may arise in different time frames. Immediate consumer harm may 
result, for example, from higher prices, but additional revenue gained 
through higher prices may fuel long-run competition to innovate new 
products that benefit consumers. The impact of these competing factors 
cannot be calculated precisely. A court must exercise considerable subjec-
tive judgment to determine, as a matter of law, whether a business practice 
violates antitrust law. These decisions are reviewed on appeal de novo. 
B. Applying the Dichotomous Analytic 
The D.C. Circuit’s 2001 decision in United States v. Microsoft33 may be the 
clearest illustration of the paradigmatic antitrust dichotomy. The government 
alleged that Microsoft abused its market power in the operating systems mar-
ket to restrain competition in the Internet browser market.34 
1. Stage One—Market Power 
The court required the plaintiff to establish the defendant’s market power 
as a “necessary element” before considering whether anticompetitive effects 
flowed from the defendant’s conduct.35 The D.C. Circuit’s Microsoft opinion 
illustrated the deferential nature of stage-one review. The trial court found 
that the relevant market excluded Apple computers, leaving Microsoft’s share 
extremely large.36 On appeal, Microsoft argued that such a narrow market 
                                                                                                                         
31 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 50–51. 
32 Id. at 50. 
33 Id. at 50–57. 
34 Id. at 50. 
35 Id. at 51; HOVENKAMP, supra note 28 § 1.7, at 45 (describing market structure as a 
prerequisite that must be supplemented with proof of anticompetitive conduct). 
36 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 52. 
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was illogical because Mac had “competed with Windows for years” and 
should not constitute a separate market “simply because the Mac OS runs on 
a different microprocessor.”37 The appellate court rejected Microsoft’s argu-
ment without independent analysis, holding that it fell “far short of what is 
required to challenge findings as clearly erroneous.”38 
Considering Microsoft’s large market share and barriers to entry, the trial 
court determined that it possessed market power.39 In rejecting Microsoft’s 
appellate argument that despite its share it lacked the ability to raise price 
profitably above the competitive level, the D.C. Circuit again cited the factual 
nature of the inquiry, stressing that Microsoft could not prevail “because the 
company does not challenge [the relevant] findings” of fact.40 
2. Stage Two—Consumer Harm 
When addressing Microsoft’s appellate challenges to the trial court’s 
stage-two analysis, the opinion took on an entirely different tone. It care-
fully reexamined whether the facts supported the trial court’s conclusion 
that Microsoft’s conduct, on balance, harmed consumers.41 The court’s 
willingness to reexamine the facts when analyzing the competitive effects 
of the defendant’s conduct is even more apparent in the sections of the 
opinion overturning the district court’s holdings that Microsoft engaged in 
unlawful attempted monopolization42 and tying.43 
C. The Origins of the Paradigm 
Although some claim a longer lineage,44 the modern antitrust dichotomy 
crystallized with the publication of two early 1980s law review articles: 
                                                                                                                         
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 54–57. In Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit applied section 2 of the Sherman Act and of-
ten referred to “monopoly power” rather than “market power.” Id. The section 2 test requires 
two elements that duplicate the rule-of-reason analysis: “(1) the possession of monopoly 
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as 
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business 
acumen, or historic accident.” Id. at 50 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 
570–71 (1966)). Citing section 1 agreement cases interchangeably with monopolization cases, 
the court made clear that the dichotomous approach is the same under both sections of the act. 
Id. at 51. 
40 Id. at 57. 
41 Id. at 58–80. 
42 Id. at 80–84. 
43 Id. at 84–97. 
44 Gregory J. Werden, Assigning Market Shares, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 68–72 (2002). 
The author is a long-serving economist at the Antitrust Division. 
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William Landes and Richard Posner’s Market Power in Antitrust Cases45 
and Frank Easterbrook’s The Limits of Antitrust.46 The former articulated an 
economic connection between market shares and market power,47 and the 
latter questioned the courts’ ability to assess competitive effects, arguing 
that market power should be a threshold requirement.48 Although the courts 
have not adopted the reasoning in either article in total, both have been 
enormously influential.49 Their theses are summarized below. 
1. Market Shares and Market Power 
Landes and Posner used the Lerner Index, which articulates a relation-
ship between price and market share,50 to thrust market power to the 
threshold of antitrust analysis. Market concentration is relevant, they ar-
gued, because a firm with a larger share, all else being equal, can raise 
price profitably to a higher level than a firm with a smaller share.51 
This conclusion rests on two intuitive economic principles. First, a 
firm with a smaller market share must reduce its own output by a greater 
percentage in order to increase the market price.52 For example, a firm 
with a fifty percent market share, assuming rival sales are fixed, must 
reduce its own output by two percent in order to decrease industry-wide 
supply by one percent.53 If the firm had a seventy-five percent share, how-
ever, it could reduce its own sales by a smaller percentage and have the 
same impact.54 A larger share thus makes market power—the ability to 
raise price profitably—more likely. 
Second, if rivals can increase capacity in response to a price increase, 
the smaller the rivals’ current shares, the less significant any percentage 
                                                                                                                         
45 Landes & Posner, supra note 27. For a concise explanation, see HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 28 § 3.1a–b, at 80–82; see also James A. Keyte, Market Definition and Differentiated 
Products: The Need for a Workable Standard, 63 ANTIRUST L.J. 697, 697 n.4 (1995). 
46 Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 1. 
47 Landes & Posner, supra note 27, at 938. 
48 Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 20–21. 
49 Fred S. McChesney, Talking ‘Bout My Antitrust Generation: Competition For And 
In The Field of Competition Law, 52 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1424 (2003) (concluding that 
“Easterbrook’s filters ... have exerted an important influence in antitrust thinking ... and 
deservedly so”). 
50 Landes & Posner, supra note 27, at 938. 
51 Id. at 939–42. 
52 Kaplow, supra note 9, at 451. 
53 Id. (explaining that reducing total supply while demand remains constant increases 
the price). 
54 Id. 
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increase in their sales will be on overall market supply.55 Thus the domi-
nant firm that increases its prices will retain more sales at the higher 
price.56 Again, a larger market share correlates with a greater likelihood of 
market power. 
Market share alone, however, cannot reveal whether a firm has market 
power. To reach a definitive conclusion, the Lerner Index requires a mar-
ket observer to know both (1) the elasticity of demand for the defendant’s 
product and (2) the capacity of the firm’s competitors to expand their 
output.57 Although these variables might be difficult to measure, each was 
thought to turn on specific observable economic behavior. If enough in-
formation could be gathered, market power could be calculated precisely. 
This fact-based inquiry could take place separate from any assessment of 
the actual effects of the business practice challenged. 
Importantly, Landes and Posner acknowledged the creative, prescrip-
tive nature of their project.58 The then-current case law and enforcement 
agency guidelines did not directly support their analysis.59 Under the Ler-
ner Index, much larger market shares would be needed to support a find-
ing of market power than the Court60 and the then-applicable merger 
guidelines required.61 As the authors forthrightly recognized, antitrust 
courts applying their analysis would have “to think far more systematical-
ly about market power than they [were then] accustomed to do[ing].”62 
                                                                                                                         
55 Id. at 452. 
56 Id.  
57 Landes & Posner, supra note 27, at 940–41. 
58 Id. at 938–39.   
59 Landes and Posner nevertheless argued that their analysis is consistent with the case 
law. But it is hard to take them seriously because they appear to pick and choose the 
passages they like while dismissing others as “puzzling.” Id. at 977. For example, they 
describe Judge Hand’s Alcoa opinion, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 
F.2d 416, 426 (2d Cir. 1945), as “in the spirit of [their] analysis” when he recognizes 
foreign aluminum effects the U.S. market, but criticize it for failing to include that pro-
duction in the relevant market. Landes & Posner, supra note 27, at 978–79. 
60 United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272 (1966) (prohibiting a mer-
ger where the post-merger firm would possess 7.5 percent of the relevant market). 
61 The 1968 guidelines used the share of the top four firms in the market as part of 
the decision whether to challenge a merger. When the four-firm share exceeded seven-
ty-five percent, it would challenge the merger if the two firms each had at least a four 
percent share or if a single firm of at least a fifteen percent share sought to merge with 
a firm of a one percent share or more. In less concentrated markets, the Division would 
challenge mergers between firms with at least a five percent share or a single firm of at 
least a twenty-five percent share that sought to acquire a firm with a one percent share 
or more. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1968), http:// 
www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11247.pdf. 
62 Landes & Posner, supra note 27, at 956.  
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2. The Market Power Screen 
In The Limits of Antitrust, Frank Easterbrook argued that judges were 
incapable of analyzing the complex economic factors driving business 
decisions.63 He thus proposed that courts adopt a series of filters that 
would have to be satisfied before considering anticompetitive effects.64 
The first and most important filter was market power as evidenced by 
market share.65 Easterbrook recommended using market power as a 
threshold requirement in every case, because, without it, firms “cannot 
injure competition no matter how hard they try.”66 The market, he main-
tained, “is better than the judicial process in discriminating the beneficial 
from the detrimental.”67 
Like Landes and Posner, Easterbrook did not purport to describe exist-
ing law.68 He openly sought to stop judges from evaluating the impact of a 
business practice on consumers until after determining that the defendant 
crossed the market power threshold.69 
                                                                                                                         
63 Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 11–12. Easterbrook explained that “it is fantastic to 
suppose that judges and juries could” fully evaluate the economic impact of a business 
practice. In addition, Easterbrook stated: 
The welfare implications of most forms of business conduct are beyond our 
ken. If we assembled twelve economists and gave them all the available da-
ta about a business practice, plus an unlimited computer budget, we would 
not get agreement about whether the practice promoted consumers’ welfare 
or economic efficiency more broadly defined. 
Id.   
64 Id. at 16–39. 
65 Id. at 17–23. 
66 Id. at 20; see Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for 
Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055, 2077 (2012) (explain-
ing the paradigmatic view as follows: “Mergers, joint ventures, and some agreements 
among competitors are harmless in competitive markets but can impose serious competi-
tive threats in highly concentrated markets. Before those agreements can be characterized 
as unlawful, the fact finder must establish either the existence of market power or the 
likelihood that the conduct at issue will create such power or facilitate its exercise.”). 
67 Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 21; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical 
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 503 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that “the inter-
brand market functions as an infinitely more efficient and more precise corrective to 
[potentially anticompetitive] behavior [by firms lacking market power than antitrust 
liability], rewarding the seller whose intrabrand restraints enhance consumer welfare 
while punishing the seller whose control of the aftermarkets is viewed unfavorably by 
interbrand consumers.”). 
68 Id. at 9 (prescribing that “[t]he judge should employ some presumptions and filters 
that will help to separate pro- and anti-competitive explanations. These filters would be 
the alternative to the inhospitality tradition, the solution to the limits of antitrust.”). 
69 Id. at 11. 
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D. 1982 Merger Guidelines 
When the Reagan Administration took office in 1981, the president 
appointed the law professor William Baxter as Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General responsible for the Antitrust Division.70 A kindred spirit of 
Landes, Posner, and Easterbrook, Baxter immediately took up the task of 
rewriting the antitrust enforcement agencies’ merger guidelines.71 The 
effort was revolutionary.72 For the first time, the guidelines defined a mar-
ket to include the products that the merging firms’ customers saw as rea-
sonable substitutes at prevailing prices and “additional products ... if a 
significant percentage of the buyers of products already included would be 
likely to shift to those other products in response to a small but significant 
and non-transitory increase in price.”73 This mode of analysis, known as 
the “SSNIP test,” has been used ever since.74 
Like the prior guidelines, the 1982 version relied on market share,75 
but the thresholds set to trigger an investigation were increased signifi-
cantly.76 The required market shares were thus more consistent with the 
                                                                                                                         
70 Lawrence J. White, Present at the Beginning of a New Era for Antitrust: Reflec-
tions 1982–1983, 16 REV. INDUS. ORG. 131, 131 (2000).  
71 Id. at 131–32. The merger guidelines were originally promulgated in 1968 to provide 
guidance on when the Division would challenge a merger. The guidelines were substantially 
revised in 1982, 1992, and 2010. They do not have the force of law, but are relevant to the law 
in two ways. First, enforcement policy must be based on the law, because the agencies do not 
have the power to block a merger. They must convince a court that the merger violates the 
law. Second, as experts, the agencies’ guidelines often influence courts interpreting the law. 
See generally United States v. Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486 (1974) (allowing the consumma-
tion of a merger despite high market shares).  
72 Id. (explaining that “the 1982 [merger guidelines were] so different in conceptual structure 
from its predecessor that few participants or commentators seriously thought of it as a ‘revision;’ 
instead, we all considered it to be a new document with a new approach”). 
73 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1982), http://www.justi 
ce.gov/atr/hmerger/11248.pdf. 
74 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 
¶ 4 (2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf [hereinafter 2010 
MERGER GUIDELINES]. 
75 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1982), supra note 73. The 1982 guidelines 
changed the focus from the total shares of the top four firms to a market-wide concentra-
tion measure, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), that summed the squares of each 
firm’s market share. Id. In this way, the distribution and size of all competitors would be 
considered with greater weight apportioned to larger firms, “which probably accords with 
their relative importance in any collusive interaction.” Id. 
76 Id. 
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Landes-Posner-Easterbrook notion that the agencies would only challenge 
a merger when the new entity would likely have market power.77 
E. 1992 Merger Guidelines 
Ten years later, the enforcement agencies revised their guidelines and so-
lidified market power’s status as a threshold requirement.78 The drafters em-
phasized that the agencies ordinarily would undertake “no further analysis” 
when a proposed merger is unlikely to “significantly increase” the market 
shares of the merging firms.79 
F. The Perceived Importance of the Paradigm 
This two-stage approach to antitrust analysis is so well engrained that 
no commentator seriously questions it.80 Antitrust lawyers and economists 
believe courts resolve many cases at stage one without considering com-
petitive effects. “[T]he outcome of more cases,” according to antitrust 
economist and law professor Jonathan Baker, “has surely turned on market 
definition than on any other substantive issue.”81 Former Federal Trade 
Commission Chairman Robert Pitofsky has thus observed that 
                                                                                                                         
77 Id. 
78 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES (1992), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf. 
79 Id. Hovenkamp describes the role of market definition under modern generally accepted 
antitrust principals “as a prerequisite to anticompetitive performance.” HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 28 § 1.7, at 45 (emphasis added) (asserting that “[s]tructure has become a necessary but 
not a sufficient cause”).  
Some lower courts ostensibly adopted this approach as law. See, e.g., FTC v. Freeman 
Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 268 (8th Cir. 1995) (asserting that “[t]he determination of the rele-
vant market is a ‘necessary predicate’ to a finding of a Clayton Act violation”); Graphic 
Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. ITEK Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1571 (11th Cir. 1983) (describing 
proving market power as “[h]aving crossed this threshold…”). 
80 Herbert Hovenkamp may come closest to seeing the dichotomy’s falsity. Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Response: Markets in IP and Antitrust, 100 GEO. L.J. 2133, 2136 (2012) 
(explaining that antitrust analysis “has either developed or borrowed technical concep-
tions of market concentration, market power, market share, entry barriers, and economies 
of scale and scope, all of which can go into an antitrust assessment of competitive ef-
fects”). Other commentators have argued antitrust analysis should include non-economic 
factors. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 
551, 595 (2012) (asserting that antitrust should take account of a broader area of goals 
than the improper exercise of market power). 
81 Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 129, 
129 (2007). See, e.g., 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 
549 (Jonathan M. Jacobson et al. eds., 6th ed. 2007) (“Defining a relevant market is often a 
critical issue, and sometimes the critical issue, in an antitrust case.”). 
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“[k]nowledgeable antitrust practitioners have long known that the most 
important single issue in most enforcement actions—because so much 
depends on it—is market definition.”82 
II. THE 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES: UNDERMINING THE FALSE DICHOTOMY? 
In 2006, the United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division (the 
Division) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC or the Commission) 
began to question the paradigmatic dichotomy.83 Division attorneys and 
economists stressed that “[t]he market definition process is not isolated 
from the other analytic components,” and the agencies thus do not always 
“define a market before proceeding to address other issues.”84 Rather, the 
agencies use an “integrated process by which the[y] ... reach an understand-
ing of the merger’s likely effect on competition.”85 Baker, who was then the 
FTC’s Bureau of Economics Director, reported the Commission’s view that 
defining a market is not a critical step in assessing the competitive impact of 
a merger when the combination “can be shown to harm competition direct-
ly.”86 Adopting a res ipsa loquitur-like approach, he reasoned that if con-
sumer harm is apparent, it must exist within a relevant market and “there is 
little need to specify the market’s precise boundaries.”87 
The 2010 revision to the 1992 guidelines formalized this view. Alt-
hough it retained the Baxter-inspired market definition methodology, the 
new drafters prefaced that section with the caveat that “[t]he measure-
ment of market shares and market concentration is not an end in itself, 
but is useful to the extent it illuminates the merger’s likely competitive 
effects” and that the analysis “need not start with market definition” as it 
had in each prior iteration.88 
To emphasize flexibility, the new guidelines began with a list of types 
of evidence that could indicate adverse competitive effects.89 Market con-
centration was listed as the third factor after (1) observed anticompetitive 
                                                                                                                         
82 Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1807 (1990); see also Lemley & McKenna, supra note 66, at 
2077–78 (defining market definition as an essential aspect of antitrust analysis). 
83 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES 15 (2006), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247.pdf. 
84 Id. at 5. 
85 Id. 
86 Jonathan B. Baker, Contemporary Empirical Merger Analysis, 5 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 347, 351 (1997). 
87 Id. 
88 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 74, at 7. 
89 Id. at 3–4. 
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effects in consummated mergers and (2) direct comparison based on expe-
rience.90 The drafters also increased the thresholds through which market 
share alone would trigger greater scrutiny,91 effectively increasing the 
cases in which the enforcement agencies would have to use other means of 
assessing a merger. 
The 2010 guidelines are subject to varying interpretations.92 Perhaps the 
drafters intended only to explore different avenues to determine market 
power within the existing dichotomy, believing evidence of anticompetitive 
effects could also be used to predict the merged firm’s power if particularly 
good evidence were available. Alternatively, however, the new guidelines 
can be read to recognize that market power is but one consideration in a 
broader analysis that invariably requires a unitary assessment of the opti-
mal competitive makeup of a particular industry.93 
III. LOUIS KAPLOW’S CRITIQUE OF MARKET DEFINITION 
Perhaps inspired by the new guidelines, Kaplow launched what he de-
scribed as “a wholesale assault on the core logic of the [market definition] 
methodology,” arguing convincingly that the process hinders a court’s ability to 
determine whether a defendant has market power.94 Taking the paradigmatic 
                                                                                                                         
90 Id. at 3. 
91 Id. at 19. 
92 See Kaplow, supra note 13, at 2, 19. Kaplow states: 
[T]he new Guidelines’ modest statements launch the evolution of mer-
ger review (further) down a slippery slope and therefore are dangerous, 
threatening to throw the process and court scrutiny into disarray. From 
this perspective, what matters less are the words themselves; reading 
between the lines, a more momentous shift may be underway.  
Id. at 16. 
Some commentators expressed concern that alternatives to standard market definition 
were too uncertain and untested. See Dennis W. Carlton, Revising the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 619, 620–21 (2010). For links to comments on 
the original questions issued by the DOJ and FTC in the Guidelines revision process and 
to comments on the proposed revision (which is close to the promulgated version), see 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES REVIEW PROJECT (2010), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/hmg/index.shtml and FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
Federal Trade Commission Seeks Views on Proposed Update of the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines #340, FTC File No. P092900 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/com 
ments/hmgrevisedguides/index.shtm. 
93 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 74, at 2 (“The Agencies consider any rea-
sonably available and reliable evidence to address the central question of whether a 
merger may substantially lessen competition.”). 
94 Kaplow, supra note 9, at 440. Kaplow’s critique spans three law review articles that 
were published in 2010 and 2011. See supra notes 6, 9 & 13. 
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rhetoric seriously, Kaplow concluded that antitrust judges are irrationally 
employing a counterproductive tool.95 He never considers, however, the pos-
sibility that courts may not be following the antitrust dichotomy.96 This sec-
tion summarizes Kaplow’s argument and then compares it to a similar mis-
understanding of the judicial role in another area of law. 
A. Understanding Kaplow’s Critique 
Kaplow contends that the practice of defining markets by calculating 
shares to draw inferences of market power is incoherent.97 Markets cannot 
be defined in a rational way and even if they could, he shows, market 
shares would not convey useful information.98 
Kaplow first demonstrated that the process of examining cross elasticity 
between products–the heart of traditional market definition–illogically re-
quires courts to search for irrelevant information.99 Knowing what products, 
if any, a firm’s customers would adopt if price increased is useless infor-
mation.100 The market elasticity of a firm’s products is the only relevant 
issue. “All [a firm] cares about,” in deciding whether to increase price, 
Kaplow explained, “is the rate at which [its customers would] reduce their 
purchases of its own product as the price rises.”101 The court thus has no 
need to determine the products to which consumers might switch in order 
to assess market power. 
Even worse, Kaplow contended, the market definition process requires 
a court to disregard known, relevant information.102 With respect to virtu-
ally any potential substitute, a court will know that (1) it has some impact 
on the defendant’s pricing decisions, but (2) less than a perfect substitute 
would have.103 Paradigmatic market definition, however, is binary. It only 
permits the court to either include the partial substitute in the market as if 
                                                                                                                         
95 Kaplow, supra note 9, at 515.  
96 Although rejecting market definition, Kaplow does not question the bifurcated 
market power-competitive effects dichotomy. See Kaplow, supra note 6, at 276 (asserting 
that market power is critical issue); Kaplow, supra note 13, at 4 (asserting that “[f]or 
economists the message is to continue or accelerate work on other ways of determining 
market power”); Kaplow, supra note 9, at 502 (recognizing need to find the best way to 
measure market power in various industries). 
97 Kaplow, supra note 9, at 516. 
98 Id. at 515. 
99 Id. at 449, 481–85. 
100 Kaplow, supra note 13, at 5 (“[T]he formula properly depicts market power re-
gardless of the particulars of demand substitution.”). 
101 Kaplow, supra note 9, at 449. 
102 Id. at 516. 
103 Id. at 515. 
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it were perfect, overstating its impact on price, or leave it out and under-
state its impact.104 Either way, the court would ignore what it knows to be 
true—that the partial substitute has a limited impact on the defendant’s 
pricing decisions.105 
Kaplow thus rejected the traditional market definition process entirely 
and argued for using the best available evidence to estimate market pow-
er.106 To illustrate his point, Kaplow posited a hypothetical merger between 
orange juice companies. Under the standard paradigm, one would ask 
whether to include, say, grapefruit juice, in the relevant market.107 To make 
that decision, however, the court would need to have a sense of whether a 
non-orange juice limited the ability of the merging firms to raise price.108 
“But,” Kaplow reasoned, “if we have already reached th[e] conclusion [that 
orange juice drinkers would switch to another juice], we are done.”109 The 
merging orange juice producers obviously lack market power. There is no 
value, according to Kaplow, in the standard exercise of deciding whether 
grapefruit juice is within the relevant market and calculating shares based 
on that decision.110 We can just rely on whatever evidence convinced us 
that OJ drinkers would switch to grapefruit juice. 
Second, Kaplow argued that even if there were a logical method to de-
fine the market and determine accurate shares, that data point would be 
virtually useless.111 Within the existing paradigm, the search for market 
power is intended to determine whether the defendant can harm consum-
ers. But market shares, Kaplow showed, provide virtually no information 
about either (1) how much market power a defendant possessed or (2) how 
much would be necessary to enable the defendant to injure its custom-
ers.112 The answer to both questions logically requires reference to the 
                                                                                                                         
104 Id. at 472. 
105 Id. at 487; accord Lemley & McKenna, supra note 66, at 2098 (explaining that 
“[t]he current approach to market definition draws an arbitrary line when what we need is 
a continuum that reflects the partial differentiation of products and differences in the cost 
and convenience of those products”). 
Kaplow further argues that the hypothetical monopolist test in the merger guidelines 
does not help define rational markets and often produces worse results. Kaplow, supra 
note 13, at 10–15; Kaplow, supra note 9, at 480. 
106 Kaplow, supra note 6, at 275. 
107 Kaplow, supra note 9, at 505–06.  
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 506. 
110 Id. at 480 (traditional market definition more likely to mask than elucidate). 
111 Kaplow, supra note 6, at 275.  
112 Id. at 255 (“[T]he market share (even in a properly defined market) does not allow 
even a rough approximation of the extent of market power.”); id. at 257 (“[T]he resulting 
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defendant’s ability to raise price, and any answer expressed in terms of 
market share “fails to address either question directly and does not appear 
capable of providing a meaningful indirect answer.”113 
Kaplow acknowledged the economic correlation between market share 
and market power as demonstrated by the Lerner Index. But he argued that 
expressing power in terms of share is “a category mistake.”114 A car’s top 
speed, he analogized, cannot be expressed in terms of its engine displace-
ment, even though that measure is “an important factor bearing on” a car’s 
potential speed.115 In both cases, the unit of measurement is not powerful 
enough to serve as the sole criterion for answering the question asked. Too 
many other relevant factors come into play. As Kaplow put it, the data 
point is “blatantly not in the terms (units) put by the question.”116 
Kaplow’s attack is powerful and his logic compelling. If judges have 
been following the two-stage paradigm—(1) using market shares as a 
proxy for market power and (2) ignoring competitive effects unless market 
shares are big enough—then those judges have been horribly misguided. 
B. An Illustrative Analogy Revealing Kaplow’s Error 
Kaplow concludes that courts act irrationally when they define markets,117 
but there is another possibility. Judges may be approaching the problem in a 
way that is very different from what the antitrust dichotomy predicts. 
A helpful analogy can be found in Bruce Ackerman’s Property and the 
Constitution,118 which analyzed a similar divergence between the para-
digmatic theory of regulatory takings and apparently out-of-sync case law. 
Ackerman attributed the disconnect to the commentators’ use of an allur-
ing analytic method that differed from the approach that the courts actual-
ly used.119 He called this method “scientific policymaking,”120 describing 
it as developing a comprehensive view of the law’s goal and a special 
technical language designed to pursue it.121 
                                                                                                                         
answers for a given market share vary too much for market share to be used even as a 
crude approximation” of market power.). 
113 Id. at 257. 
114 Id. at 253. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 275. 
118 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 2–3 (1977). 
119 Id. at 168. 
120 Id. at 23–24. 
121 Id. at 10–11. 
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A legal analyst of the scientific-policy-making type, Ackerman ex-
plained, “manipulates technical legal concepts so as to illuminate ... the 
relationship between disputed legal rules and the Comprehensive View he 
understands to govern the legal system.”122 For example, Jeremy Bentham 
was a scientific policymaker whose comprehensive view was that legal 
rules should be set to best maximize utility.123 
Commentators like Landes, Posner, Easterbrook, and Kaplow advance 
the comprehensive view that antitrust law should limit the ability of firms to 
raise price profitably above the competitive level. Also, they use the tech-
nical language of economics—the Lerner Index, elasticity, demand, and 
supply substitution—to pursue that goal. This approach fits comfortably 
within the scientific policymaking framework. 
Ackerman argued that scientific policymaking can create “the basis for 
a body of ... law that is both powerful and deeply grounded.”124 In takings 
cases, it “seem[ed] familiar[] and ... sensible.”125 Yet, the results it pre-
dicted bore “very little relationship to the [existing legal] rules.”126 
The same problem infects antitrust law. As Kaplow demonstrated, the 
existing legal rules of market definition bear little relation to those that a 
court would pursue were it truly interested in assessing the defendant’s 
market power as a threshold issue.127 In such a case, as Ackerman put it, 
there are two possibilities: “either ... the judges have been strikingly inept 
or ... they have been thinking about [the] law in a way that is strikingly 
different from that characteristic of the Scientific Policymaker.”128 In the 
takings area, Ackerman concluded that courts were using ordinary observ-
ers’ subjective understanding of the scope of property rights rather than 
the criteria advanced by the scientific policy-makers.129 
Antitrust courts have similarly pursued a “strikingly different” path 
from the comprehensive view that market power is a threshold require-
ment that must be proven before a court may consider the effect of a de-
fendant’s conduct on consumers.130 The following section explains that 
                                                                                                                         
122 Id. at 15. 
123 Id. at 11. 




127 Kaplow, supra note 6, at 275. 
128 ACKERMAN, supra note 118, at 24–25. 
129 Id. at 168. 
130 Tellingly, in discussing the Lerner Index and market power, Herbert Hovenkamp’s 
leading treatise fails to cite a single Supreme Court case and includes no source at all 
prior to Landes’s and Posner’s 1981 article. HOVENKAMP, supra note 28 § 3.1, at 79 n.2. 
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this alternative requires the court to determine the best competitive makeup 
of an industry. Once that question is answered, the result is straightforward. 
If the defendant restrains competition in a realm that should be subjected to 
rivalry, it violates the antitrust laws; otherwise, it does not. 
IV. DETERMINING COMPETITIVE MAKEUP: WHAT COURTS DO WHEN THEY 
SAY THEY ARE DEFINING MARKETS 
The competitive makeup of an industry is a roadmap to the realms of 
business behavior in which antitrust law requires rivalry and those in 
which it does not. For example, rivalry is generally required in the realm 
of short-run price setting.131 A firm with a patent on a superior technology, 
however, may block competition to provide its patented product and charge 
supra-competitive prices without running afoul of antitrust law.132 Rivalry 
thus does not regulate the short-run unilateral pricing realm when a superior 
patented technology drives the market.133 This is true despite the patent 
holder’s market power. The antitrust dichotomy cannot explain why this 
type of market power does not count. Under the competitive makeup ap-
proach, however, the answer is simple—the best makeup of an industry 
driven by a superior patented technology permits foreclosure in the realm 
of short-run pricing of the patented product. Despite some consumer harm, 
                                                                                                                         
If courts were actually searching for market power in this way, one would expect a longer 
trail. In a recent article, Hovenkamp argued that with respect to innovation, “market 
power assessment will probably never do a good job ... because innovation is so badly 
behaved, often producing completely unanticipated results.” Hovenkamp, supra note 80, 
at 2135. Hovenkamp notes: 
[A] problem with traditional market definition approaches to power is 
that they tend to lump [distinguishable products] into the same market, 
ignoring the differences between them. By contrast, a problem with di-
rect measurements based on observed customer behavior is that, alt-
hough they account more fully for current product differences, they do 
not take innovation mobility into account. 
Id. at 2148. 
131 See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 48 (1990) (quoting United States v. 
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940)) (explaining that “‘[u]nder the Sherman 
Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fix-
ing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is 
illegal per se’”). 
132 FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013) (explaining that a “patent own-
er [may be able] to charge a higher-than-competitive price for the patented product” 
without violating the antitrust laws); see United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 
490 (1926) (permitting a patent holder on a single product to impose resale price mainte-
nance when those agreements were per se illegal on unpatented products). 
133 Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231; Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. at 490. 
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foreclosure in this realm stimulates innovation in the future that benefits 
consumers more than the short-run high prices hurt them. 
The singular relevant question for an antitrust court is whether the de-
fendant thwarted competitive forces in a realm in which rivalry efficiently 
regulates market conduct. An industry’s best competitive makeup is the 
one in which rivalry is compelled in those realms that antitrust can regu-
late efficiently, but no others.134 
Knowing whether a defendant has market power may be relevant to an 
industry’s competitive makeup. But power alone does not convey much 
information. Firms are often permitted to exercise power—a monopolist 
for example can profitably charge prices above the competitive level with 
no antitrust repercussions—and a lack of market power does not necessari-
ly insulate a defendant from liability when a plausible theory points to 
consumer harm.135 Competitive makeup is thus a superior tool to the para-
digmatic dichotomy. 
This section flushes out the competitive makeup concept and then 
shows, perhaps surprisingly, that the Supreme Court—albeit without using 
the term competitive makeup—has instructed the lower courts to apply a 
method of analysis that looks just like it.136 
A. Distinguishing Competitive from Non-Competitive Realms 
The notion that antitrust law does not require rivalry in all realms of 
business behavior is not new. As Easterbrook explained, “[p]art of the 
difficulty in antitrust comes from ambiguity in what we mean by compe-
tition.”137 In each industry, firms conduct business in a unique mix of 
rivalrous, cooperative, and potentially foreclosable realms.138 The non-
competitive realms are efficient despite competitive restraints because 
they enable rivalry to serve consumer interests in other realms. 
To illustrate the point, Easterbrook explained that “[t]he Chicago 
Board of Trade perhaps the closest of modern markets to the textbook ideal 
[of a market governed by rivalry], has a sheaf of rules and cooperative 
                                                                                                                         
134 Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 1. 
135 See infra Part IV.F.4.a (discussing the per se rule); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image 
Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 470–79 (1992) (holding that copy machine manu-
facturer lacking market power in the copier market may nonetheless violate the antitrust 
laws for limiting the sale of spare parts for its machines). 
136 See infra Part IV.F. 
137 Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 13. 
138 Id. at 1 (explaining that “[e]very market entails substantial cooperation over some 
domain in order to facilitate competition elsewhere”). 
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arrangements that reduce the cost of competition.”139 If an antitrust court 
simply tried to move each industry closer to the textbook model, “it is sure 
to be wrong a great deal of the time.”140 
B. Neoclassical v. Austrian Economics 
Easterbrook’s solution was a market power filter that would block 
courts from intervening in markets unless the defendants controlled a large 
share.141 Using market power to limit antitrust analysis is consistent with 
neoclassical economics. Prices are viewed as an objectively determinable 
function of production costs, and the optimal price is generally thought to 
be the marginal cost of production.142 If the market structure indicated the 
defendant could price above that cost-based measure, a firm had power 
and would violate the antitrust laws if it used that power to harm consum-
ers. But when a firm had a small share, a judge could rule for the defendant 
without assessing the impact of the defendant’s conduct on consumers. 
Although the structural factors necessary to predict market power may not 
be obvious, a court has a better chance of determining them based on ob-
jective information than it has of predicting whether particular business 
practices would harm consumers. Also, within a neoclassical economic 
worldview, without market power the firm simply could not inflict enough 
harm on consumers to justify the cost of antitrust intervention.143 So, the 
court has no need to go further. 
                                                                                                                         
139 Id.  
140 Id. at 2. Economic research confirms Easterbrook’s point. Consumer welfare is 
likely maximized by a mixed realm of competition and cooperation, rather than either an 
atomistic or a monopolistic one. For the classic text on this topic, see EDWARD H. 
CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLIST COMPETITION (1933). See also CHRISTINA 
BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING 
LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 9–10 (2012); JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MICROECONOMICS: 
THEORY & APPLICATIONS WITH CALCULUS 483 (2008); THE MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 
REVOLUTION IN RETROSPECT (Steven Brakman & Ben J. Heijdra eds., 2004); JEAN TIROLE, 
THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 274–95 (1988). For a simple graphical analysis, 
see Cost and Revenue for Monopoly and Monopolistic Competition, WOLFRAM 
DEMONSTRATIONS PROJECT, http://demonstrations.wolfram.com/CostAndRevenueForMono 
polyAndMonopolisticCompetition/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
141 Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 14–39. 
142 FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (describing the role of the 
market as “advanc[ing] social welfare by ensuring the provision of desired goods and 
services to consumers at a price approximating the marginal cost of providing them”). 
143 As Deven Desai and Spencer Waller explain, “[t]he rise of the Chicago School as the 
prevailing economic discourse for antitrust reinforced the focus on price theory to the 
exclusion of most other factors. It relegated business discourse to the fringes of the profes-
sion of antitrust, whether practiced by the liberal or conservative wings of the discipline.” 
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Although Kaplow called for taking account of all available infor-
mation to determine market power, he did not question the neoclassical 
economic underpinnings of the antitrust dichotomy.144 Courts could con-
tinue to use price theory to predict a market power threshold so long as 
they discarded the fiction that market share analysis was a useful way to 
answer that threshold question. But Kaplow ignored the fact that a firm’s 
ability to raise price profitably—no less than a firm’s market share—
provides insufficient information to enable a court to draw a reasonable 
inference about whether the defendant harmed consumers in a way that 
should violate the antitrust laws. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has not rested its antitrust decisions on either 
Easterbrook’s or Kaplow’s dichotomies. Instead, the Court’s analysis 
reflects an aspect of the Austrian school of economics that rejects both the 
idea that prices can be derived from costs and that a firm’s ability to raise 
price profitably is inherently suspect.145 Austrian economics posits that 
prices arise out of a dynamic process of individual entrepreneurial deci-
sions.146 An analyst thus cannot focus objectively on costs and price. The 
legitimacy of business conduct must be assessed subjectively given the 
preference of antitrust law to use rivalry to advance consumer interests.147 
As circumstances evolve and change, entrepreneurial actors seek profit 
opportunities.148 One cannot assume a given product should be sold at its 
marginal cost or even the price that would prevail if multiple sellers were 
offering identical versions of that product within a defined geographic 
area. Prices exceeding marginal cost often benefit consumers and do not 
violate the antitrust laws.149 Entrepreneurial actions should contravene 
                                                                                                                         
Deven R. Desai & Spencer Waller, Brands, Competition, and the Law, 2010 BYU L. 
REV. 1425, 1465–66. 
144 See generally Kaplow, supra note 6.  
145 United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974) (quoting Brown 
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 n.38 (1961)) (“[S]tatistics concerning 
market share and concentration, while of great significance, were not conclusive indica-
tors of anticompetitive effects ... ‘only a further examination of the particular market–its 
structure, history and probable future–can provide the appropriate setting for judging the 
probable anticompetitive effect of the merger.’”). 
146 BETTINA B. GREAVES, HUMAN ACTION 329 (1996). 
147 See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999). 
148 Cf. FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 46 (D.D.C. 1998) (quoting FTC v. 
Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128, 1132 (D.D.C. 1986) (explaining that determining “the 
relevant market in the end is ‘a matter of business reality—[]of how the market is perceived 
by those who strive for profit in it,’” and thus the court must “take into account the economic 
and commercial realities of the [particular] pharmaceutical industry”). 
149 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 66, at 2097 (explaining that the notion of marginal 
cost makes little sense in multi-product industries where the successful products must cover 
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antitrust only if a firm’s dynamic decisions blunt competition in realms in 
which rivalry would best serve consumer interests.150 
The Supreme Court appears to recognize, like the Austrians, that judg-
es can comprehend basic entrepreneurial instincts to: (1) seek out profit 
opportunities; (2) avoid competition that would undermine profit; and (3) 
use opportunities for profit to drive competition.151 The Court’s reliance on 
a “rudimentary understanding of economics”152 that is widely accessible 
links directly to the Austrian insight. Intuitive knowledge, although rudi-
mentary in some sense, can enable a judge to assess subjectively whether a 
given competitive restraint promotes consumer welfare or detracts from it. 
C. Judicial Competence 
Easterbrook recognized the importance of an industry’s competitive 
makeup.153 He favored the antitrust dichotomy, however, because he believed 
that courts were incapable of assessing whether competition should govern in 
a particular realm.154 “[I]t is fantastic to suppose,” he contended, “that judges 
and juries could ... evaluat[e a business practice]. The welfare implications of 
most forms of business conduct are beyond our ken.”155 Even businessper-
sons, he thought, generally cannot explain how the market operates.156 A 
judge who tried to evaluate the extent to which a business practice harmed 
consumers, Easterbrook concluded, would be “at sea.”157 
                                                                                                                         
the costs of unsuccessful ones); Hovenkamp, supra note 80, at 2140 (“[I]n many IP-rich 
markets, the ratio of fixed to variable costs is extremely high, and marginal cost measures 
only variable cost,” creating an “illusion of market power” based on standard analytical 
tools.). Even the notion that prices always tend to move toward marginal cost appears to be 
wrong. Mark Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 315–18 (1984) (showing that even 
in many seller markets prices do not invariably tend toward marginal cost). 
150 JESÚS HUERTA DE SOTO, THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL: MARKET ORDER AND 
ENTREPRENEURIAL CREATIVITY 85–86 (2008). 
151 See infra IV.F. 
152 Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 757.  
153 See Easterbrook, supra note 16. 
154 Id. at 10–13. 
155 Id. at 10. 
156 Id. at 5 (arguing that “sometimes no one knows” why a business practice suc-
ceeds). But see id. at 11 (recognizing that economists could reasonably assess market 
practices by “resort[ing] to clues and shortcuts [and] us[ing] their economic knowledge of 
other markets to draw inferences about this one,” but concluding that judges could not 
apply these techniques in the context of the then-existing law). 
157 Id. at 2. Although this Part explains that the Supreme Court has generally ex-
pressed more confidence in the courts’ abilities than Easterbrook, there was a period in 
the mid-Twentieth Century when the Court appeared to agree. For example, in United 
States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), ironically a case with which 
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The Austrian School, by contrast, believes that the judiciary can mean-
ingfully assess competition’s value within particular market realms.158 
Economic reasoning, the Austrians recognized, is universal and unspecial-
ized.159 Everyone participating in an economy as a producer or consumer 
has the ability to make and assess entrepreneurial decisions.160 A non-
expert’s “inner reflection ... is made possible,” Austrian economist Jesús 
Huerta de Soto has explained, “by the fact that in economics (like no other 
science) the researcher enjoys the privilege of having the same nature as 
those observed, a situation which provides them with extremely valuable 
first-hand knowledge.”161 
To illustrate the distinction between a neoclassical and an Austrian ap-
proach, imagine a drug market consisting of two brand name drugs and 
generic competitors. Assuming all of the market shares were relatively 
small, neoclassical economics would rule out antitrust intervention on the 
ground that if any drug company attempted to price its drug above the 
competitive level for an extended period, it would reduce its profits and 
thus be forced to reverse course. If brand-name drug owners consistently 
charged higher prices, Easterbrook would urge the law to ignore the issue 
as beyond the ken of antitrust judges. Kaplow would require detailed eco-
nomic analysis.162 The Austrian School would recognize that a judge is 
                                                                                                                         
Easterbrook disagreed, see Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 22, the Court rejected the 
argument that competition should not govern in a particular realm of the grocery industry 
because Congress must make the  
decision ... to sacrifice competition in one portion of the economy for 
greater competition in another portion.... [C]ourts are ill-equipped and ill-
situated for such decisionmaking. To analyze, interpret, and evaluate the 
myriad of competing interests and the endless data that would surely be 
brought to bear on such decisions, and to make the delicate judgment on 
the relative values to society of competitive areas of the economy, the 
judgment of the elected representatives of the people is required.  
Topco, 405 U.S. at 611–12. 
158 The Austrian School’s seminal work is CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 
191–225 (James Dingwall & Bert F. Hoselitz trans., 1871), available at http://mises.org 
/Books/Mengerprinciples.pdf (addressing a theory of price in chapter five). For an acces-
sible summary of Menger’s ideas as well as more recent work by Austrian economists, 
see JESÚS HUERTA DE SOTO, supra note 150, at 85–86 (comparing the Austrian School 
with the Neoclassical School). 
159 HUERTA DE SOTO, supra note 150, at 16–17, 73. 
160 Id. at 16–17. 
161 Id. at 42. 
162 Kaplow claims that regardless of a judge’s economic acumen, market power deter-
minations cannot be made intuitively because nothing about “the analysis is sensory; ‘mar-
kets’ as the term is used in this context are pure abstractions.” Kaplow, supra note 9, at 507. 
“[N]othing one can view (that is, other than data, reports of consumer behavior, and so 
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capable of (1) understanding the phenomenon that leads some drug users 
to pay more for a branded drug that is otherwise identical to a generic and 
(2) using antitrust appropriately to address potential consumer harm.163 
The following sections show the courts adhere more closely to the Austri-
an approach than to any version of the antitrust dichotomy. 
D. The Terms Used to Define Competitive Makeup 
The term competitive makeup has been chosen to contrast with the 
more common phrase competitive structure. The latter term suggests an 
objective, fixed underpinning like the skeleton of a body or the girders in a 
building. The term makeup is intended to suggest a more malleable sub-
jective concept that, whether selected intentionally or developed organi-
cally, is not fixed but can be readily changed more or less without struc-
tural alterations. The competitive makeup of an industry is to its 
competitive structure what the psychic makeup is to the skeletal structure 
in a human body, and the process of determining an industry’s best com-
petitive makeup differs from simply observing market behavior as draw-
ing differs from tracing. A court must take account of the dimensions on 
which firms optimally should compete and those on which they should be 
permitted to cooperate164 or foreclose competition.165 A critical question 
will always be whether immediate short-run competition (typically on 
price) or longer-run competition (generally aimed at innovation) would 
best serve antitrust’s goal of advancing consumer welfare through compe-
tition in a particular industry at a particular time.166 Secondarily, questions 
                                                                                                                         
forth),” he argues, would illuminate “in the literal sense whether one particular market 
definition is ‘closer’ to the truth than another. Among other things, one would first have to 
generate an image of the truth, which is precisely the point of this argument.” Id. 
163 See generally MENGER, supra note 158.  
164 Cooperation often occurs on standards, but courts have also recognized it may be 
pro-competitive in certain instances. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 
472 U.S. 585, 605–07, 610 (1984) (marketing of ski lift tickets found to be pro-competitive 
among competitors); Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (co-
operating firms found pro-competitive in commodities market). 
165 Property rights isolate particular assets from competition. The patent system is the 
most obvious example, but real property and chattels have the same effect of enabling 
only one firm, the owner, to compete using particular property. Steven Semeraro, Proper-
ty’s End: Why Competition Policy Should Limit the Right of Publicity, 43 CONN. L. REV. 
753, 792–818 (2011). 
166 Cf. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 664 (1964) (Harlan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to “the subtle and necessarily speculative 
questions involved in assessing the short-term and long-term effects of this merger ...”). 
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may arise about whether industry participants should compete on packages 
of goods or services,167 quality,168 or the choices provided to consumers.169 
Within this alternate framework, defining the competitive market is a 
creative, subjective process as opposed to an observational, objective one. A 
finding that consumers substitute one product for another or that a defendant 
can profitably raise price is relevant but hardly definitive.170 A firm’s con-
duct also communicates its expectation that what it does will have substantial 
market effect. Also, competitors and consumers will inform the judge’s 
understanding of how the market works.171 Judges meld this information 
with their own intuitive understanding of how entrepreneurs seek profit in 
order to determine an industry’s best competitive makeup. 
E. An Illustrative Example 
Before examining the case law, this section presents an example illustrating 
the tradeoff between short and longer-term benefits that courts must make in 
determining an industry’s best competitive makeup. Understanding the nature 
                                                                                                                         
167 See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459–60 (1986) (holding that 
in the dental industry a “refusal to compete with respect to the package of services ... no 
less than a refusal to compete with respect to the price term of an agreement, impairs the 
ability of the market to advance social welfare ...”). 
168 See, e.g., Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605–07, 610 (noting harm from the unavailability 
of all-Aspen ticket, that deprived consumers of the ability to “make their own choice on 
these matters of quality”). 
169 See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984) 
(finding that athletic association’s actions “can be viewed as procompetitive” because 
they “widen consumer choice ...”). 
170 Lemley and McKenna capture the flavor of the competitive makeup inquiry in 
their description of how a court should approach market definition in a case involving a 
defendant’s intellectual property rights. 
The general point is that the competitive costs of IP rights vary with the 
extent to which they enable the owners of those rights to exclude close 
substitutes, and courts should therefore conceive of competition in the 
IP space in terms of the quality of available substitutes.... Indeed, there 
may be multiple dimensions to the differentiation, including price, 
quality, and (for IP goods) brand association. 
Lemley & McKenna, supra note 66, at 2102.  
171 Cf. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (using evidence that patent 
owner agreed to pay alleged infringer large sum to drop its challenge to patent indicates 
that patent holder has the ability to charge supra-competitive prices); Rothery Storage & 
Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 218 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting Brown 
Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962)) (explaining that “[t]he ‘industry or 
public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic’ unit matters because we 
assume that economic actors usually have accurate perceptions of economic realities”). 
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of this critical tradeoff helps reveal the competitive makeup assessment that is 
often masked in the case law by the rhetoric of dichotomy. 
Pursuant to the regulatory statutes governing the provision of Internet 
access, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) determined 
whether Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that already had access to resi-
dential property—legacy telephony and cable TV companies—should be 
compelled to allow competitive ISPs to use the physical connections to 
individual homes in order to compete.172 Although the FCC’s decisions 
are opaque and may turn, in part, on non-economic concerns, the differing 
competitive makeup of the two industries can rationalize the Commis-
sion’s differing conclusions. 
On the telephony side, the FCC enabled short-run price competition by 
requiring legacy telephone service providers to permit competitive ISPs to 
use their telephone wires.173 The Commission likely concluded that innova-
tion in telephony markets would be adequate without the additional profits 
that could be garnered if legacy providers were permitted to foreclose com-
petitive ISPs. Competition, the FCC concluded, could productively regulate 
this realm, and the best competitive makeup of the traditional telephone in-
dustry thus included rivalry between the legacy provider and competitive ISPs 
to provide Internet access over telephone wires.174 
In contrast, the FCC favored innovation rivalry over short-run price 
competition in the cable industry, allowing cable companies to foreclose 
competition by denying ISPs access to their cable lines.175 As the Supreme 
Court put it, the Commission found that “changed market conditions”—
namely that Internet access was already provided competitively when the 
cable companies sought to enter the market—“warrant[ed] different treat-
ment” of telephone and cable companies.176 Presumably, the Commission 
compared the benefit from (1) spurring the cable companies to innovate by 
allowing them to avoid competition, on the one hand, and (2) the price 
competition that would result if ISPs were allowed to use the cable lines, 
                                                                                                                         
172 47 U.S.C.A. § 251 (West 2014). 
173 In re Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, 
13 FCC Rcd. 24,012, 24,030–31 (1998) (classifying DSL service as a telecommunica-
tions service); In re Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Comm’ns Rules & Regula-
tions (Third Computer Inquiry), 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 964 (1986). 
174 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-458 (1996) (stating that the purpose of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 is to “provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy 
framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced tele-
communications and information technologies and services to all Americans”). 
175 In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable & Other 
Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4826 (2002). 
176 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1001 (2005). 
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on the other. This calculation may have been accurate for two reasons. 
First, as the Court recognized, by the time cable companies sought to enter 
the ISP market, telephony access provided existing competition. The tele-
phone companies initially had no ISP competitors. Second, the cable com-
panies needed to exert greater innovative effort to perfect Internet access 
over their lines. The best competitive makeup of the cable industry thus 
did not require rivalry to provide Internet access over cable wires. Rather a 
cooperative arrangement between the cable companies and selective ISP 
competitors, or one in which cable companies foreclosed all competition 
over their lines, constituted better competitive makeups of the cable indus-
try than one that compelled rivalry over those lines. 
F. Case Law Support 
Case after case reveals that antitrust courts, as the competitive makeup ap-
proach requires, trade off the benefits of short and longer-run competition to 
determine the realms in which rivalry should be required.177 From the earliest 
cases, the courts have recognized that competitive restraints were not all bad.178 
Although consumers benefit immediately from the lower-priced and higher-
quality goods and services that result from rivalry in the marketplace, consum-
ers also benefit when protecting firms from competition in one realm enables 
them to compete efficiently in another realm.179 
Because blunting short-run price competition can spur innovation, the 
courts have permitted firms with market power to engage in anti-consumer 
conduct.180 A monopolist, for example, may charge a price exceeding the 
                                                                                                                         
177 See, e.g., id. at 1000–02 (discussing why initially regulating DSL providers as 
common carriers promoted competition, while doing the same for cable modem service 
providers would do the opposite); High-Speed Access, 17 FCC Rcd. at 4826. 
178 See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Mitchel 
v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 350 (Q.B. 1711). 
179 Polk Bros v. Forest City, Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Antitrust law is de-
signed to ensure an appropriate blend of cooperation and competition, not to require all eco-
nomic actors to compete full tilt at every moment.”); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel 
Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898) (“Contracts for the partial restraint of trade are upheld, not 
because they are advantageous to the individual with whom the contract is made, ... but be-
cause it is for the benefit of the public at large that they should be enforced.”).  
180 See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant 
charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the 
free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short 
period—is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that 
produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the 
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competitive level without violating the antitrust laws, no matter how con-
clusive the evidence that the supra-competitive price harms consumers.181 
Similarly, some non-pricing practices that foreclose competition do not 
violate the antitrust laws even when the defendant has market power. As 
the Supreme Court explained in the early Board of Trade of Chicago deci-
sion, restraints on competition in one realm may regulate and therefore 
enhance competition in another realm.182 The Board surely had market 
power, and its rule limiting certain trades unquestionably harmed those 
who sought to make the prohibited trades.183 Yet, the Court ruled in favor 
of the defendant.184 As Justice Brandeis put it, “[t]he true test of legality is 
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps 
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or 
even destroy competition.”185 
The antitrust dichotomy cannot explain the results in cases such as 
Board of Trade of Chicago that permit defendants with market power to 
harm consumers. But the competitive makeup approach can. Monopolists 
may set high prices or foreclose certain forms of competition because 
short-run harm to consumers incentivizes consumer-friendly innovation 
and competitive entry in the longer run. 
Just as proof of market power, no matter how extreme, and harm to 
consumers does not invariably lead to antitrust liability, the absence of 
market power or consumer harm does not always insulate a firm from 
liability.186 The Supreme Court has made this point repeatedly through the 
per se doctrine.187 A naked agreement to fix prices is thus per se illegal 
regardless of whether the plaintiff can prove that the defendants have 
market power or that consumers have been harmed.188 
Again, the antitrust dichotomy cannot explain the per se decisions. But 
the competitive makeup approach can. The best competitive makeup of 
                                                                                                                         
possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an 
element of anticompetitive conduct.”).  
181 Id. The Court has also favorably cited Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 
(Q.B. 1711), which applies a similar balance to a restraint in the sale of a non-intellectual, 
property-based business. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 
688–89 (1978); accord Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 280–81. 
182 Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 237. 
183 In particular, the Court mentions the “four or five warehouseman in Chicago” that 
together had a monopoly on the trade before the restrictions were put in place. Id. at 237. 
184 Id. at 241. 
185 Id. at 238. 
186 See infra Part IV.F.4.a. 
187 See infra Part IV.F. 
188 See infra Part IV.F. 
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most industries requires each firm to make its own decisions about output, 
prices, and the markets in which it will compete. Antitrust law permits 
cooperative behavior only when firms sufficiently integrate their opera-
tions. Even though there may be no market power or short-run competitive 
injury, naked horizontal agreements create the risk of undermining con-
sumer welfare in the longer run. 
The following sub-sections review the case law in some detail to show 
that these situations are not mere exceptions to the antitrust dichotomy. On 
the contrary, courts tradeoff shorter- and longer-run gains and losses, albe-
it sometimes tacitly, in every case to determine an industry’s best competi-
tive makeup.189 Only after analyzing these tradeoffs can a court meaning-
fully determine whether the defendant’s conduct restrained competition 
that should have existed given that industry’s best competitive makeup. 
1. Early Case Law 
This subsection compares three early cases and demonstrates how the 
competitive makeup approach explains the results, but the antitrust dichot-
omy does not. 
a. Mitchel v. Reynolds 
The early English restraint-of-trade decision in Mitchel v. Reynolds,190 
cited favorably by the U.S. Supreme Court,191 typifies the competitive 
makeup approach. In Mitchel, the court upheld an agreement prohibiting a 
baker from competing in a particular geographic area for five years after 
the sale of an ongoing business.192 Although restraints of trade were pro-
hibited under English law, the court explained that when a restraint is part 
of a pro-competitive contract, “the particular circumstances” must be re-
viewed carefully before assessing the restraint’s lawfulness.193 
The Mitchel court upheld the restraint because it was limited to a specific 
“neighbourhood” where only one bakery was likely to operate.194 When the 
only question is who that operator would be, “the concern of the public is equal 
                                                                                                                         
189 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13 (1984) (ex-
plaining that the patent example is “a special application of the cooperation-competition 
balance” and that there is always “a tradeoff between optimal incentives ex ante and opti-
mal use of existing knowledge”). 
190 Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711). 
191 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688–89 (1978). 
192 Mitchel, 24 Eng. Rep. at 352. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 349. 
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on both sides,”195 the court explained, and the “the restraint [wa]s exactly pro-
portioned to the consideration, viz. the term of five years.”196 
Market power was apparently irrelevant to the court’s decision. The 
bakery unquestionably had the power to raise price profitably and surely 
planned to use it. But the court never mentioned it. What mattered was that 
business owners should have the ability to enter reasonably limited non-
compete agreements to ensure adequate incentives to build successful busi-
nesses in the first place.197 In the terms used here, the ideal competitive 
makeup of the baking industry permitted the defendant to foreclose compe-
tition for a period sufficient to enable the profitable sale of a business, 
which in turn incentivized the development of new businesses that over 
time would benefit consumers than short-run price rivalry would have. 
b. Board of Trade of Chicago 
The same pattern can be seen again and again in U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions. In Board of Trade of Chicago, an early case interpreting the 
Sherman Act, the government attacked the “call rule” that effectively 
fixed the price for grain in transit to Chicago until the market re-opened at 
the last price before the market close.198 In overturning a decision striking 
down the rule, the Court explained that any harm caused by restricting 
short-term price competition was outweighed by the longer-term benefits 
from the cost-savings, information access, and market expansion provided 
by the Board of Trade.199 As in Mitchel, the best competitive makeup of 
the commodity trading industry did not include the sort of competition that 
the Board restrained. As a result, the defendant was permitted to foreclose 
competition in that realm.200 
c. Addyston Pipe 
In another seminal Sherman Act case, Addyston Pipe, the government 
argued that a price-fixing agreement among firms selling more than half of 
                                                                                                                         
195 Id. at 352. 
196 Id. Of course, if the market could really only support one bakery, there would have 
been no need for the covenant not to compete. 
197 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688–89 (1978); accord 
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898). 
198 Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 237 (1918). 
199 Id. at 240–41 (explaining that these include expanded the market participants and 
their knowledge of the market, enabling them to operate on smaller margins and thus 
lower prices). 
200 Id. at 241. 
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the cast iron pipe in a certain geographic area violated the Sherman Act.201 
Then-Judge Taft quoted Mitchel, explaining that “‘whether this is or not a 
reasonable restraint of trade’” must turn on whether it merely “afford[ed] a 
fair protection to the interests of the party in favor of whom it is given,” or 
went further and “interfere[d] with the interests of the public.”202 That is, 
whether the restraint was in a realm best governed by rivalry. 
In contrast to the restraint in Mitchel—which was upheld because it 
heightened the incentives to build successful businesses—the combination of 
price-fixing and geographic concentration in Addyston Pipe tended to “dis-
courage industry and enterprise, and diminish the products of ingenuity and 
skill.”203 In such a case, there was little to balance against the harm resulting 
from a lack of price competition.204 No specific fact enabled the court to 
conclude this restraint had a deleterious effect on innovation.205 It certainly 
did not rely exclusively on market share. Instead, it subjectively assessed the 
industry to conclude that the form of competition restrained fell within a 
realm that should be competitive and thus was part of the best competitive 
makeup of the pipe industry. 
d. Understanding the Early Cases 
In Mitchel and Board of Trade of Chicago, the courts concluded that, 
in the industries at issue, the best competitive makeup would not compel 
competition among bakers immediately upon the sale of a bakery business 
or among commodity agents (and their buyers) during hours when a com-
modity exchange market was closed.206 Although the defendants likely 
had monopoly power, these forms of foreclosure and cooperation pro-
duced significant public benefits over the longer term that outweighed the 
short-run benefit that rivalry would have produced. In Addyston Pipe, the 
defendants likely had less power than the defendants in Mitchel and Board 
of Trade of Chicago given that they did not possess a complete monopoly 
and entry was likely easier. Nevertheless, the best competitive makeup of 
that market required pipe manufacturers to compete on short-run prices. 
Longer-run benefits of coordination were not wholly absent. For example, 
                                                                                                                         
201 Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 291–92. 
202 Id. at 282 (quoting Horner v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735, 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P. 1831)); 
id. at 282–83 (explaining that the law permits a restraint that is “necessary to the protec-
tion of either party”). 
203 Id. at 280 (quoting Alger v. Thacher, 1837 WL 3220 (Mass. 1837)). 
204 Id. at 302. 
205 See id. 
206 Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711); Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United 
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
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the potential for greater profit would draw competitive entry into the pipe 
industry. The critical difference was that the longer-term consumer bene-
fits from the pipe manufacturers’ restraint were unlikely to outweigh the 
short-run loss of competition. 
2. Dominant Firm Regulation 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act207 governs the unilateral activity of dom-
inant firms.208 Just as the early agreement cases discussed above employed 
the competitive makeup approach rather than the paradigmatic dichotomy, 
the dominant firm cases do so as well. 
a. Alcoa 
In 1945, Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in Alcoa articulated a theoreti-
cal basis for attacking concentrated economic power that would drive mer-
ger enforcement policy, in addition to dominant firm regulation, for two 
decades.209 Importantly, he stressed that if one focused exclusively on “eco-
nomic considerations,” then concentrated producing power, even if not 
“used extortionately,” could raise serious antitrust concern.210 
“[U]nchallenged economic power,” he explained may “deaden[] initiative, 
discourage[] thrift and depress[] energy.”211 Where competition spurs inno-
vation, a dominant position can be a “narcotic,” deadening the competitive 
drive.212 “[T]he spur of constant stress is necessary,” he wrote, “to counter-
act an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone.”213 Although econo-
mists recognized even a monopolist must be concerned about satisfying its 
                                                                                                                         
207 15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2014). 
208 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). Although 
Alcoa was a lower court decision, the Supreme Court soon clarified that it constituted binding 
nationwide precedent. Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811–12 (1946) 
(explaining that Alcoa “was decided ... under unique circumstances which add to its weight as 
a precedent.... That court sat in that case under a new statute authorizing it to render a decision 
‘in lieu of a decision by the Supreme Court’ and providing that such decision ‘shall be final 
and there shall be no review of such decision by appeal or certiorari or otherwise.’”). 
209 Id.; see William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncer-
tain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 
1117–19 (1989) (discussing how Alcoa decision reinvigorated Sherman Act enforcement 
and heavily influenced deconcentration policy until President Johnson’s antitrust policies 
took the reins in 1969). 
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customers,214 Hand stressed “competitors, versed in the craft as no con-
sumer can be, will be quick to detect opportunities for saving and new 
shifts in production, and be eager to profit by them.”215 Despite his famous 
references to market share,216 none of these conclusions flowed from 
them. Hand subjectively assessed the value of competition in the alumi-
num industry, taking a page from the Austrian economists’ book.217 
Hand has been accused of ascribing to an antiquated notion of antitrust 
that saw big as, invariably, bad.218 But he was actually quite careful not to 
fall into that trap. Although he certainly took market share into account, he 
acknowledged “size does not determine guilt; … there must be some ‘ex-
clusion’ of competitors; … growth must be something else than ‘natural’ 
or ‘normal’; that there must be a ‘wrongful intent,’ or some other specific 
intent; or that some ‘unduly’ coercive means must be used.”219 As he fa-
mously put it, “[t]he successful competitor, having been urged to compete, 
must not be turned upon when he wins.”220 
Important for the purposes of this Article, Hand’s focus was decidedly 
not on the ability of a firm to raise price profitably. The potential benefits 
of competition, rather than the negative consequences of its absence drove 
his analysis.221 This point is illustrated by his decision to exclude recycled 
aluminum from the market.222 In counting only virgin aluminum, Hand 
effectively decided the best competitive makeup of the aluminum industry 
would stimulate the market for recycling longer term—rather than maximize 
short-run price.223 No objective market fact dictated that decision. Hand 
                                                                                                                         
214 Id. at 426–27. 
215 Id. The U.S. Supreme Court explicitly adopted this reasoning in Am. Tobacco Co. 
v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 813–15 (1946). 
216 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 427 (explaining that while a share “over ninety ... is enough to 
constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be 
enough; and certainly thirty-three per cent is not”). 
217 See id.; infra Part IV.B. 
218 Eugene V. Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 
U. CHI. L. REV. 567, 577 (1947) (commenting that “[i]n the Aluminum case Judge Hand 
finally interred and reversed the old dictum that size is not an offense under the Sherman 
Act. Size, he concluded, was not only evidence of violation, or a potential offense, ... it 
was the essence of the offense”). 
219 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 429. 
220 Id. at 430. 
221 See id. at 427 (mentioning existence of social and moral benefits resulting from 
having many competitors in an industry, rather than a few). 
222 Id. at 425 (referring to recycled aluminum as “secondary”). 
223 Id. Similarly, in discussing imported aluminum, Judge Hand made the judgment 
that the antitrust market should be narrow enough to preclude Alcoa’s exploiting “the 
limits afforded by the tariff and the cost of transportation.” Id. at 426. 
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used his ability to subjectively assess the value of competition in the 
industry before him to determine the best competitive makeup of the 
aluminum industry. 
b. Grinnell and Griffith 
By the 1960s, United States v. Grinnell Corp. established that section 
2 case required a plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant “willful[ly] 
acqui[red] or maint[ained] ... [monopoly] power as distinguished from 
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business 
acumen, or historic accident.”224 The use of a dominant position to gain a 
competitive advantage, however, was suspect. In United States v. Grif-
fith,225 for example, the Court explained that a firm with a dominant posi-
tion in fire alarm systems in some geographic markets could not use that 
position “to gain a competitive advantage”226 elsewhere even if “no com-
petitors were driven out of business, or acquired by appellees, or impeded 
in their business by threats or coercion ....”227 Again, the focus on com-
petitive advantage embodied a subjective assessment about the value of 
competition in a particular realm, rather than an objective calculation of 
the defendant’s ability to properly raise price.228 
                                                                                                                         
The Second Circuit’s analysis of the price squeeze—the spread between Alcoa’s 
wholesale and retail price—similarly constructed a competitive makeup in which Alcoa 
had to enable meaningful retail competition. Id. at 436–38. That conclusion about the 
aluminum industry differs from the Supreme Court’s recent assessment of a price squeeze 
in the telecommunications market. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 
U.S. 438 (2009). But that difference is precisely the point—courts do not simply observe 
market behavior; they construct appropriate competitive makeups for the industry in 
question. The appropriate makeup of the unregulated aluminum industry in the 1940s 
surely differed from the best makeup of the regulated telephony industry in the early 
twenty-first century. 
224 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966). 
225 334 U.S. 100 (1948). 
226 Id. at 107. 
227 Id. at 109. 
228 Even Du Pont can be interpreted as divining the best competitive makeup of the 
industry. Although it is generally interpreted as resolving the case at the first stage of a 
dichotomous analytic by finding that Du Pont lacked market power, it may have actually 
held that the best competitive makeup of the flexible wrapping industry does not require 
competition within individual types of wrapping. Given that the government alleged that 
Du Pont had monopolized the “cellophane market,” the Court may have ruled against the 
government not because Du Pont lacked market power, but because there was no cello-
phane market to monopolize. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 
U.S. 377 (1956). 
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c. Modern Dominant Firm Doctrine 
In the past decade, the Court has seemingly contradicted Alcoa’s ap-
proach,229 holding that even where statutory law compels cooperation,230 
the antitrust laws do not.231 A monopolist telecommunications carrier is 
thus free, as far as the antitrust laws are concerned, to gain a competitive 
advantage from its dominant position by refusing to deal with competitors, 
delaying a competitor’s entry,232 or charging a price for wholesale services 
that is too high to permit viable retail competition.233 
Alcoa’s monopolization standard has thus evolved, but not toward one that 
focuses on the ability to raise price profitably as the singular threshold issue. 
Rather, the Court has continued to search for an industry’s ideal competitive 
makeup. Judge Hand was faced with determining the makeup for a mid-
century, unregulated, relatively stable aluminum industry in which new entrants 
faced significant barriers to entry. He concluded the best competitive makeup 
of such an industry—the one that would best serve consumer interests—
required a successful enterprise to avoid a sustained dominant position by deal-
ing with competitors on reasonable terms.234 
For the modern Court, the best competitive makeup in the dynamic, twen-
ty-first century, regulated telecommunications industry, not surprisingly, did 
not include similar duties to foster short-run competition.235 Barriers to new 
entry were lower and supported by specific statutory requirements designed to 
                                                                                                                         
229 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 452 n.3 (2009) (sig-
naling the Court’s change in view by responding to an argument based on Alcoa by 
stating that “[g]iven developments in economic theory and antitrust jurisprudence since 
Alcoa, we find our recent decisions ... more pertinent to the question before us”). 
230 See generally Steven Semeraro, The Efficiency and Fairness of Enforced Sharing: 
An Examination of the Essence of Antitrust, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 57 (2003) (analyzing the 
Supreme Court’s refusal to find an antitrust violation when a monopolist violated a statu-
torily imposed duty to cooperate). 
231 Pac. Bell, 555 U.S. at 448 n.2 (2009) (holding that duties imposed by telecommu-
nications regulations do not impose antitrust duties). 
232 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
415 (2004). 
233 Pac. Bell, 555 U.S. at 450–51. 
234 Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (noting Alcoa’s practices and dealings 
with potential competitors prevented them from ever entering market). 
235 The Court made quite clear that the regulated nature of the telecommunications in-
dustry was relevant to its decision. Verizon, 540 U.S. at 411–12 (“One factor of particular 
importance is the existence of a regulatory structure designed to deter and remedy anti-
competitive harm. Where such a structure exists, the additional benefit to competition 
provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small, and it will be less plausible that 
the antitrust laws contemplate such additional scrutiny.”). 
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channel competition.236 In that context, the Court concluded, the tradeoff be-
tween short-run high prices and longer-run entry and innovation weighed in 
favor of using rivalry to regulate the longer-run realm.237 
Justice Scalia made this point quite explicitly for the Court in Verizon, 
emphasizing that antitrust law’s longer-run goal is “[t]o safeguard the 
incentive to innovate.”238 The ability to raise price profitably was a posi-
tive development for consumer welfare in this industry. Scalia explained: 
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charg-
ing of monopoly prices is not only not unlawful, it is an important ele-
ment of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly 
prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts ‘business acumen’ 
in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and 
economic growth.239 
The Court determined that the best competitive makeup of the telecommu-
nications industry did not require the short-run competition that the plaintiff 
sought because longer-run competition better served consumer interests.240 
d. Dominance Through Intellectual Property Rights 
In many cases, intellectual property rights may convey a degree of 
market power on an antitrust defendant. Like any dominant firm, an 
intellectual property holder may use this power to form cooperative rela-
tionships through licensing, or it may attempt to foreclose competition 
altogether by prohibiting competitors from using its property.241 Under 
the antitrust dichotomy, when an intellectual property holder has market 
power, increasing short-run prices would appear to violate the law. After 
all, the defendant has power and is foreclosing competition and charging 
prices above the competitive level. 
                                                                                                                         
236 The Telecommunications Act of 1996 required legacy local telephone providers to 
deal with competitors in certain ways. 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2006). 
237 See Pac. Bell Tel. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. at 452; Brooke Grp. Ltd. 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225–27 (1993). 
238 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 
407 (2004). 
239 Id.; see Hovenkamp, supra note 80, at 2148 (“The inducement for creating [intel-
lectual property] is the prospect of the ... returns” it generates.). 
240 Verizon, 540 U.S. at 407–08. 
241 See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926) (permitting patentee to 
license a patented technology that controlled the resale price of a patented article at a time 
when resale price maintenance was treated as per se illegal); Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 
13 (“[I]t is now understood that the grant of patent rights, though creating a restriction of 
output during the patent’s life, is important to give people incentives to invent.”). 
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The competitive makeup approach, however, explains why intellec-
tual property holders may sometimes, but only sometimes, violate the 
antitrust laws. Longer-run innovative competition is often more valuable 
in intellectual property intensive industries, and when that is true, anti-
trust does not require rivalry with respect to either prices or short-run 
quality improvements. 
Some antitrust cases in the lower courts suggest that property rights 
entirely exempt a defendant from antitrust scrutiny.242 The Supreme 
Court, however, has repeatedly rejected that approach.243 To be sure, 
industries in which intellectual property rights are important have differ-
ent competitive makeups than industries without significant intellectual 
property rights. But those differences do not immunize intellectual prop-
erty holders from antitrust liability. Recognizing that creative entrepre-
neurs will discover ways to use their intellectual property to stifle rivalry 
in realms where it would benefit consumers, the Court has imposed anti-
trust liability on intellectual property owners of every sort.244 The Court 
also developed the concept of misuse245—including the first-sale rule,246 
the patent fraud doctrine,247 and the prohibition of sham litigation248—to 
                                                                                                                         
242 See, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012) (set-
tlements generally “immune from antitrust attack”), rev’d and remanded by FTC v. 
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 
F.3d 1323, 1333–36 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (similar), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. 
Ct. 2223 (2013); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212–13 (2d Cir. 
2006) (similar), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
243 See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2232 (2013). 
244 See id. (holding that settlement of a drug patent case may violate the antitrust laws 
even if the patent is valid); United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 49–50 (1962) 
(holding the same for a copyright holder); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 
364, 390–91 (1948) (holding that courts must “balance the privileges of [the patent hold-
er] and its licensees under the patent grants with the prohibitions of the Sherman Act 
against combinations and attempts to monopolize.”); United States v. Line Material Co., 
333 U.S. 287, 310 (1948) (holding that a cross licensing agreement that included resale 
price maintenance of patented products set by agreement among the patent holders con-
stituted “the improper use of [a patent] monopoly” violating the antitrust laws). 
Similar considerations also drive whether a patent should even be available. See 
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012). 
245 See, e.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 30 (1964) (holding that attempting to 
charge licensing royalties beyond expiration of a patent constitutes misuse). 
246 See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621 (2008) 
(holding that patent may not be used to restrain competition after first sale). 
247 Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174  
248 Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 
60–61 (1993) (adopting standards for showing when sham efforts to enforce a patent may 
violate the antitrust laws). 
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identify when a realm should be rivalrous despite a significant intellectual 
property right.249 
The functionality doctrine in trademark law further illustrates the 
approach courts take in intellectual property cases.250 The doctrine pro-
hibits a firm from using a functional aspect of its product as a trademark 
because doing so would “inhibit[] legitimate competition by allowing a 
producer to control a useful product feature.”251 In most situations, 
competition to use a particular mark is not required because consumers 
receive greater long-run benefits by relying on marks to identify the 
source of products. For example, in Brandir International, Inc. v. Cas-
cade Pacific Lumber Co.,252 the trademark owner was able to prevent a 
competitor from using a mark embodying a feature of the product. The 
Second Circuit held that the one-piece undulating feature of a bicycle 
rack was not functional because other forms of bicycle racks could be 
made that would compete with the trademark holder’s rack.253 This 
conclusion was not self-evident. The court had to consider the nature of 
                                                                                                                         
249 Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) (“The grant of a patent might tend to impede in-
novation more than it would tend to promote it … [and] too broad an interpretation of this 
exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent law.”). The Court further explained that:  
Patent protection is, after all, a two-edged sword. On the one hand, the 
promise of exclusive rights provides monetary incentives that lead to 
creation, invention, and discovery. On the other hand, that very exclu-
sivity can impede the flow of information that might permit, indeed 
spur, invention, by, for example, raising the price of using the patented 
ideas once created, requiring potential users to conduct costly and time-
consuming searches of existing patents and pending patent applications, 
and requiring the negotiation of complex licensing arrangements. At 
the same time, patent law’s general rules must govern inventive activity 
in many different fields of human endeavor, with the result that the 
practical effects of rules that reflect a general effort to balance these 
considerations may differ from one field to another. 
Id. at 1305; see Semeraro, supra note 230, at 76–79 (reviewing case law requiring firms 
to share property to facilitate competition). 
250 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164–65 (1995). 
251 Id. 
252 Brandir Int’l Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1148 (2d Cir. 
1987); see also Topps Co. v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co., 96 Civ. 7302 (RWS), 1996 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 18556, at *22–26, *28–29 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1996) (holding that an infringer 
cannot circumvent trade dress protection by asserting a defense of functionality on the 
theory the prior user’s design constitutes a narrow product line, with which the infringer 
can only compete by copying the prior user’s design elements); Warner Bros. Inc. v. Gay 
Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 330, 334 (2d Cir. 1983) (defining product line as toy cars rather 
than “Dukes of Hazzard” toy cars); In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1045 
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (defining product line as toy dolls rather than superhero dolls). 
253 Brandir Int’l, 834 F.2d at 1148. 
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competition in bicycle rack markets to determine that the industry’s best 
competitive makeup favored longer-run competition to innovate new 
types of bicycle racks over short-run price competition of those with 
Brandir’s one-piece undulaters. 
When a court concludes a mark contains a functional element, the 
tradeoff flips in favor of short-run competition. For example, in Dippin’ 
Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distribution, the court held that a trademark on 
the shape of frozen ice cream was functional.254 Of course, ice cream has 
long been sold in a variety of other forms, and thus competition could 
have continued even if the plaintiff were prohibited from using a particu-
lar shape. The court had to subjectively assess the industry’s competitive 
makeup to conclude that in the ice cream industry short-run competition 
with respect to a particular shape would best serve consumer interests.255 
Again, the antitrust dichotomy cannot explain the results in these 
cases. Firms with strong brands often have market power, and limiting 
the use of their trademarks by competitors will harm consumers through 
higher prices.256 The power-or-effect dichotomy has no ready means to 
explain why trademark holders can exploit this market power only if 
their marks do not include functional elements of their product. 
The competitive makeup approach provides a workable system to de-
cide these cases. By taking account of the relative value of short- and 
longer-term consumer interests within a particular industry, a court de-
termining the best competitive makeup can reasonably evaluate the value 
of rivalry with respect to a trademarked element.257 
                                                                                                                         
254 Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distribution, LLC, 369 F.3d 1197, 1202 (11th 
Cir. 2004). 
255 Id. at 1206. 
256 See generally Desai & Waller, supra note 143, at 1450–84 (discussing the relation-
ship among brands, trademarks, and competition). 
257 In line with the 2010 merger guidelines and Kaplow’s critique, Lemley and 
McKenna argue that antitrust law needs to use evidence of anticompetitive effects, rather 
than purely structural evidence, to determine market power. Lemley & McKenna, supra 
note 66, at 2059. “The problems with market definition also mean that antitrust law must 
pay more attention to actual competitive effects and less attention to nice numerical 
formulas in evaluating mergers and anticompetitive conduct.” Id. at 2101. An enhanced 
focus on effects, however, cannot bring coherence to the antitrust dichotomy because it 
does not provide a means to determine if particular effects are justified. Lemley and 
McKenna correctly recognized that courts need to determine “how much competition we 
want in this space” and that “they might well make different policy judgments in different 
circumstances.” Id. at 2102–03. 
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3. Merger Cases258 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Court precluded mergers that in-
creased concentration even when the merged firm’s share was not large 
enough to suggest market power.259 In these cases, the Court did not focus 
on the post-merger firm’s immediate ability to raise prices profitably. But 
it did recognize that its task was more complicated than simply calculating 
market shares. In Philadelphia National Bank, for example, Justice Bren-
nan wrote that assessing the competitive impact of a merger required “a 
workable compromise” that “delineat[ed]” the market in a “fair” way.260 
There, the Court recognized that it could have legitimately viewed the 
banking market in different ways.261 In these merger cases, the Court ap-
pears to have appreciated that it needed to determine the best competitive 
makeup of the industry, rather than merely calculating market shares to 
determine market power. Its process appears to have favored the long-run 
goal of encouraging internal expansion rather than growth through merger. 
The Court’s most recent substantive merger case, United States v. 
General Dynamics,262 is often read as a change of course from its earlier 
cases. Rather than block a merger despite relatively low market shares, the 
Court permitted a merger despite relatively high shares.263 Again, howev-
er, the apparent change can also be explained by the Court’s following the 
competitive makeup approach rather than the antitrust dichotomy. 
In General Dynamics, the government presented evidence based on 
historic sales of an increasingly concentrated coal market.264 Based on the 
standard paradigm, the merger certainly appeared problematic given the 
large market shares.265 But the trial court was not fooled, recognizing that 
the competitive makeup of the coal industry did not support the govern-
ment’s proposed market or the inference of market power from historic 
                                                                                                                         
258 Mergers are governed by § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West 2014). 
259 See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 281 (1964) (ex-
plaining that the acquired company “seems to us the prototype of the small independent 
that Congress aimed to preserve”); United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 365 
n.42 (1963) (“[I]f concentration is already great, the importance of preventing even slight 
increases in concentration and so preserving the possibility of eventual deconcentration is 
correspondingly great.”). 
260 Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 361. 
261 Id. at 360–61. 
262 United States v. Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486 (1974). 
263 Id. at 503. 
264 Id. at 494–96. 
265 See id. at 496 (recognizing that the Court had blocked mergers based on the type of 
statistical showing that the government offered). 
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sales.266 In upholding the trial court, Justice Stewart explained the compet-
itive makeup of industries such as beer and groceries—where the Court 
had blocked mergers despite small shares—included an assumption that 
historic market shares would likely persist.267 The coal industry had a 
different competitive makeup because uncommitted reserves constituted a 
better measure of future competitive significance.268 
Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has not played a significant role in 
merger enforcement.269 But the leading lower court cases, including FTC v. 
Staples270 and FTC v. Whole Foods Market,271 have turned on competitive 
makeup rather than inferences of market power drawn from market shares. 
In Staples, the court looked past the many sources of office supplies and the 
small shares of individual providers, focusing on the meaningful competi-
tion that existed between office superstores.272 Although the Court 
acknowledged “a broad market encompassing the sale of consumable office 
supplies by all sellers of such supplies” and that all these sellers “at some 
level, compete with one another,” it ultimately used market definition as a 
tool to reveal a competitive makeup for the office supply industry that re-
quired superstores to compete.273 
In Whole Foods, the lower court concluded that all grocery stores were 
in the relevant market and, thus, the best competitive makeup did not re-
quire competing stores specializing in organic products.274 The appellate 
court disagreed, not because the lower court drew the wrong inference 
from the observable facts, but because the appellate court recognized a 
possibility for beneficial competition in organic products.275 That is, the 
best competitive makeup of the grocery industry would include a rivalrous 
realm in the sale of organic products. 
                                                                                                                         
266 Id. at 491–94. 
267 Id. at 501. 
268 Id. at 501–02. 
269 Thomas E. Kauper, Merger Control in the United States and The European Union: 
Some Observations, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 305, 315 (2000) (explaining that “[t]he Su-
preme Court has not decided a merger case on the merits since 1974”). 
270 FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997). 
271 FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
272 Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1080. 
273 Id. at 1075. 
274 Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1033 (citing district court opinion). 
275 See id. at 1040–41 (recognizing that core customers would pay more for some organ-
ic products); id. at 1046–47 (Tatel, J., concurring) (following Staples holding evidence of 
higher prices in markets where the merging parties did not compete suggests they are in 
separate markets). 
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In each case, the decision turned on an assessment about how competi-
tion should operate in the industry, not strictly on an observation of how it 
did operate. To be sure, the courts relied on statistics about how certain 
types of competition affected certain types of prices.276 But the decision 
was not dictated by statistics. As the disagreement among the judges on 
the appellate panel in Whole Foods demonstrated,277 the decision about 
whether competition in a particular realm was required had to be con-
structed from a conception of the proper makeup of the market. 
4. Modern Non-merger Horizontal Agreement Cases 
Under section 1 of the Sherman Act,278 the competitive makeup ap-
proach again explains the case law more readily than the paradigmatic 
dichotomy. The following sections review the per se doctrine, which im-
poses liability without proof of market power. It then compares and con-
trasts two pairs of similar rule-of-reason cases, and finally, it reviews the 
Court’s most recent rule-of-reason case, which renewed the long-standing 
position that intellectual property rights do not insulate an agreement from 
antitrust scrutiny. 
a. Per Se Cases 
The per se doctrine provides the clearest example of the use of the 
competitive makeup approach.279 It holds that naked horizontal agree-
ments that restrain trade are illegal without requiring the plaintiff to prove 
that the defendant had market power or that consumers were harmed.280 
Per se illegal practices are often said to include price-fixing, market divi-
sion, bid rigging, customer allocation, and certain group boycotts.281 In 
                                                                                                                         
276 Id. at 1040; Staples, 970 F. Supp. at  1075–78. 
277 Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1041, 1051 (writing separately, each judge voiced their opin-
ion; Judge Brown’s lead opinion was not joined by Judge Tatel’s concurrence in the judgment).  
278 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2014). 
279 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (“[T]here are certain agree-
ments or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of 
any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal 
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse 
for their use.”).  
280 Id. 
281 See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49–50 (1990) (per curiam) (holding 
agreement not to compete, including an agreement to allocate territory per se illegal); FTC v. 
Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 435–36 (1990) (group boycott); Arizona v. 
Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982) (agreement to set maximum price); 
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 648–50 (1980) (per curiam) (agreement not 
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actual practice, however, the Supreme Court has not imposed bright-line 
rules.282 Instead, courts decide whether a per se rule applies by determin-
ing the best competitive makeup of the industry.283 
The competitive makeup inquiry in per se cases is implemented 
through what the courts have called the naked agreement requirement.284 
A business practice that would be per se illegal may not be if it is an inte-
grated part of a potentially pro-competitive agreement.285 For example, a 
group boycott is per se illegal if it functions solely to restrain immediate 
price competition in a market where innovation is not important.286 In 
contrast, a boycott may be lawful when used to enforce rules governing a 
pro-competitive group purchasing agreement.287 Even agreements fixing 
price may be permissible when sufficiently integrated into a pro-
competitive scheme.288 
These decisions about whether an agreement is naked or integrated are 
inquiries into the competitive makeup of the industry. Some integration is 
not enough, and no universal rule draws a bright line.289 Rather, the per se 
cases are best understood to condemn an agreement when a court deter-
mines that competition in a particular industry should govern the realm in 
                                                                                                                         
to compete on credit terms); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) 
(agreement to divide territories); Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 
211–13 (1959) (group boycott); Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395–96 
(1947) (tying); Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466–67 
(1941) (group boycott); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 
(1940) (agreement to stabilize price); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 
(6th Cir. 1898), modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (territorial division). 
282 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1979) (holding that even though 
Broadcast Music engaged in literal price-fixing as defined by the Sherman Act, this did 
not mean they were “per se in violation of the Sherman Act”). 
283 See supra notes 281–82. 
284 BMI, 441 U.S. at 20 (explaining that the agreement before the Court was “not a 
‘naked restrain[t] of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition,’ ... but rather 
[it] accompanie[d] the integration of sales, monitoring, and enforcement”); compare 
Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5–7 (2006) (refusing to apply per se rule to an inte-
grated joint venture agreement that included a jointly set price term), with White Motor 
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) (explaining that per se rule applies to 
“naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition ...”). 
285 See Texaco, 547 U.S. at 5–6. 
286 See Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 433–34; Klor’s, 359 U.S. at 212. 
287 See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 
284, 296 (1985). 
288 See BMI, 441 U.S. at 20. 
289 Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 342, 348 (1982) (applying 
the per se rule even though an agreement to set maximum prices was part of an integrated 
agreement to provide insurance coverage). 
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which the agreement restrained rivalry. By concluding that an agreement 
is sufficiently integrated, however, the court effectively finds the competi-
tive makeup of the industry is such that competition should not govern the 
realm in which the agreement restrained rivalry.290 
In both BMI and Catalano, the parties made plausible arguments that 
their agreements were integrated.291 In the former, the Court concurred 
because blanket song-copyright licenses significantly reduced the transac-
tion costs that individual negotiation and monitoring would entail.292 By 
contrast, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s finding that an agreement 
prohibiting the sale of beer on credit was part of an integrated scheme to (1) 
open the distribution market to new competitors and (2) spur competition by 
increasing pricing visibility.293 No objective standard of integration dictated 
these results. Rather, the Court determined that the best competitive makeup 
of the beer delivery industry required immediate competition on credit 
terms while the best competitive makeup of song-copyright licensing did 
not necessarily compel individual copyright owners to compete on price.294 
b. Professional Engineers and California Dental Association 
In 1978’s National Society of Professional Engineers, the Antitrust Di-
vision challenged a rule prohibiting engineers from including a price in their 
initial project proposal.295 In 1999’s California Dental Association, the FTC 
challenged a rule prohibiting dentists from including discounting infor-
mation in advertisements.296 In both cases, the organizations sought to justi-
fy their rules on ethical grounds,297 and both associations had market power. 
The Court struck down the engineers’ rule but not the dentists’.298 
The difference in the outcomes can be explained by the contrasting com-
petitive makeups of the two industries. In bidding markets with sophisticated 
buyers, as with most engineering projects, if firms include prices in their 
                                                                                                                         
290 See Texaco, 547 U.S. at 5–6, (refusing to apply the per se rule to integrated agree-
ment). In rejecting the per se rule, a court would not be holding definitively that the best 
competitive makeup of the industry has been achieved. It would signal only that further 
analysis would be required. BMI, 441 U.S. at 24–25 (rejecting application of the per se 
rule but remanding with instructions to consider the practice under the rule of reason). 
291 Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 645 (1980) (per curiam); BMI, 
441 U.S. at 7. 
292 BMI, 441 U.S. at 20–21. 
293 Catalano, 446 U.S. at 645–46. 
294 Id. at 643–44; BMI, 441 U.S. at 20–22. 
295 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 681(1978). 
296 Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 762 (1999). 
297 Id. at 760–61; Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 681. 
298 Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 781; Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 694–96. 
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bids, the ensuing competition would stimulate more efficient engineering.299 
The engineers countered that the tradeoff for short-run price competition 
would be a longer-run trend toward unethical bidding and compromises on 
safety and quality.300 
In favoring short-run price competition in the engineering industry, the 
Court did not discuss the defendant’s market power.301 Instead, it contrasted 
the facts before it with those of Mitchel v. Reynolds.302 In that case, Justice 
Stevens explained, the English court had held that “[t]he long-run benefit of 
enhancing the marketability of the business itself—and thereby providing 
incentives to develop such an enterprise—outweighed the temporary and 
limited loss of competition.”303 No similar long-run competitive concern in 
the engineering market outweighed the benefit of short-run competition.304 
As a result, the best competitive makeup of the engineering industry includ-
ed price competition in engineers’ initial bids.305 
In California Dental, by contrast, the Court recognized that retail dental 
markets are “characterized by striking disparities between the information 
available to the professional and the patient,” a mass market of unsophisti-
cated customers.306 Even competitors, Justice Souter recognized, faced 
“significant challenges to informed decisionmaking.”307 In overturning the 
lower court’s use of a truncated rule-of-reason analysis,308 the majority 
focused on the tradeoff between short-run price competition that discount 
advertising would generate and longer-run competition made possible by 
preserving a market in which relatively uninformed customers had accurate 
information.309 On remand, the lower court chose a competitive makeup 
that permitted advertising restraints to ensure more accurate information.310 
                                                                                                                         
299 Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 695 (“The assumption that competition is the best method 
of allocating resources in a free market recognizes that all elements of a bargain-quality, 
service, safety, and durability-and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the 
free opportunity to select among alternative offers.”). 
300 Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 693–94. 
301 See id.   
302 See supra Part IV.F.1.a; Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 688–89.  
303 Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 689. 
304 Id. at 696.  
305 Id.   
306 Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999). 
307 Id. at 773. 
308 Id. at 763–65. 
309 See id. at 774–75 (“[E]ven if across-the-board discount advertisements were more 
effective in drawing customers in the short run, the recurrence of some measure of inten-
tional or accidental misstatement due to the breadth of their claims might leak out over 
time to make potential patients skeptical of any such across-the-board advertising, so 
undercutting the method’s effectiveness.”). 
310 Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 957 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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Justice Souter’s opinion in California Dental went further than Profes-
sional Engineers in highlighting the subjective component of antitrust 
analysis. First, he explained that in the Supreme Court cases in which 
antitrust liability had been upheld, “an observer with even a rudimentary 
understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in ques-
tion would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”311 
As Justice Souter emphasized, reaching that conclusion required courts to 
consult “theory”312 and consider the impact of a restraint within a particu-
lar industry.313 Merely observing market facts was not enough. 
Second, although the available facts about how the market operates are 
relevant, identifying the industry’s best competitive makeup is the judge’s 
ultimate task.314 Without mentioning market power,315 Justice Souter’s 
majority opinion explained that “there must be some indication that the 
court making the decision has properly identified the theoretical basis for 
the anticompetitive effects and considered whether the effects actually 
are anticompetitive.”316 He also “emphasized the necessity, particularly 
great in the quasi-common law realm of antitrust, that courts explain the 
logic of their conclusions,”317 where mechanically applying a formula 
would not suffice. “[T]here is generally no categorical line to be drawn,” 
he explained, between types of restraints.318 “What is required ... is an 
enquiry meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details, and logic 
of a restraint. The object is to … [make] a confident conclusion about the 
principal tendency of a restriction ….”319 
c. NCAA and BMI 
In the NCAA v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma320 foot-
ball case and the Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS321 copyright case, the 
                                                                                                                         
311 Cal. Dental, 526 U.S at 770. 
312 See id. at 771. 
313 See id. at 773 (emphasizing that an anticompetitive practice in one industry “could 
have different effects from those ‘normally’ found in the commercial world” in another 
industry, perhaps even pro-competitive effects). 
314 See id. at 779 (holding that the “Court of Appeals’s [sic] conclusion at least re-
quired a more extended examination of the possible factual underpinnings”). 
315 Even the dissent only “assume[d]” that market power would be a relevant issue. Id. 
at 788 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
316 Id. at 775 n.12 (emphasis added). 
317 Id. at 780. 
318 Id. 
319 Id. at 781. 
320 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
321 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
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Court dealt with licensing arrangements between the defendants and 
television networks. The Court in NCAA held that universities had to 
engage in short-run price competition to license college football tele-
casts.322 In BMI, however, the Court found reasons to favor a different 
competitive makeup in the music copyright licensing industry. The bene-
fits of coordination in licensing thousands of available songs—such as 
one-stop shopping and centralized monitoring—created long-run com-
petitive benefits that outweigh the short-run benefits that would flow 
from copyright-to-copyright price competition.323 No similar long-run 
benefit applied to the televising of college football games, and thus the 
Court determined that the competitive makeup of the college football 
television market required short-run competition.324 
d. Actavis 
In its most recent antitrust case, FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,325 the Court held 
that a patent holder could violate the antitrust laws by paying an alleged 
infringer to withhold its product from the market until the patent ex-
pired.326 Lower courts had held that as long as the agreement limited com-
petition during the life of the patent, the settlement would fall within the 
patent’s scope and could not violate the antitrust laws.327 The Court reject-
ed that reasoning.328 A court must, Justice Breyer wrote for the majority, 
“seek to accommodate patent and antitrust policies.”329 This process in-
volves more than the search for market power and competitive effects. 
After all, the patent holder obviously had market power and the agreement 
ensured that consumers would pay much more for the drug than they 
would have in a competitive market. Under the antitrust dichotomy, the 
defendant’s payment would always violate the antitrust laws. 
The Court might have recognized a bright-line exception for patent 
holders, but it did not. Trial courts, the Actavis majority explained, must 
consider all aspects bearing on the anticompetitive effect of a business 
                                                                                                                         
322 NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113. 
323 BMI, 441 U.S. at 20–21. The Court has also held dentists and doctors had to en-
gage in short-run competition with respect to their dealings with health insurance compa-
nies. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 341–42, 348–49, 351–54 
(1982); FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457–65 (1986). 
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325 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
326 Id. at 2227. 
327 Id. at 2230. 
328 See id. at 2227. 
329 Id. at 2233. 
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practice to determine whether a patent holder violated the antitrust laws.330 
Courts must vary the depth of their inquiry “with the circumstances” and 
“avoid, on the one hand, the use of antitrust theories too abbreviated to 
permit proper analysis, and, on the other, consideration of every possible 
fact or theory irrespective of the minimal light it may shed on the basic 
question—that of the presence of significant unjustified anticompetitive 
consequences.”331 In other words, the court must determine the best com-
petitive makeup of the industry in order to assess whether the defendant 
restrained rivalry in a realm efficiently governed by competition.332 
V. RESPONDING TO THE LIKELY CRITIQUE 
Critics of the competitive makeup approach will likely contend that 
Part IV reads too much into Supreme Court dicta and places too little 
weight on lower court cases that time and again dismiss antitrust claims 
based solely—so they say—on the defendants’ lack of market power.333 In 
per se cases, the critic will likely argue that the Court simply presumes 
that market power exists. The intellectual property cases are exceptions in 
which market power is tolerated, and in the dominant firm, merger, and 
rule-of-reason and agreement cases, the Court was either (1) discussing 
market power without saying so explicitly or (2) discussing effects in 
cases where market power was obvious. 
This Part distinguishes the antitrust dichotomy and the competitive 
makeup approaches and then shows that courts do not apply the dichoto-
my even when they say that they are. 
A. Distinguishing the Antitrust Dichotomy from the Competitive Makeup 
Approach 
How one views antitrust analysis depends on how one frames the concept 
of market power. Everyone knows the market share needed to establish power 
under the standard dichotomy varies by industry and depends on entry barri-
ers, excess capacity, and other factors.334 Similarly, the competitive makeup 
takes account of a defendant’s ability to impact the market in determining 
                                                                                                                         
330 See id. at 2238.   
331 Id.  
332 Id. at 2237 (stressing that “[t]he existence and degree of any anticompetitive con-
sequence may also vary ... among industries”). 
333 See, e.g., Bathke v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, Inc., 64 F.3d 340, 345 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(“Antitrust claims often rise or fall on the definition of the relevant market.”). 
334 See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (hold-
ing that a location restriction should be analyzed under the rule of reason); United States 
v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that low barriers to entry 
rendered the resulting high market share of a merger inapposite). 
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which realms should be governed competitively. No one would dispute that 
rivalry is not always required and that the value of competition varies across 
industries and time.335 
The real point of disagreement is whether market power is capable of 
playing the gatekeeper role Easterbrook envisioned for it.336 If all a critic 
of the competitive makeup approach means by a “market power threshold 
inquiry” is that courts impose antitrust liability only when the defendants 
are capable of harming consumers, then there is no real disagreement.337 It 
is always possible at the end of the analysis to conclude that if rivalry 
should prevail in a particular market realm, then the defendants’ conduct is 
not innocuous. 
Concluding post-hoc that the defendant may cause harm, however, is 
not what the antitrust dichotomy holds. As crystallized by Landes, Posner, 
and Easterbrook (and as accepted by virtually all modern antitrust commen-
tators), the dichotomy maintains that a court can meaningfully determine 
whether a defendant has the ability to harm consumers without examining 
what the defendant has actually done or theorizing about what it might 
do.338 Indeed, the main point of the market power threshold, according to 
Easterbrook, was to free courts from the need to assess conduct and effect 
by allowing them to focus exclusively on market structure.339 
This Article contends that market power cannot meaningfully play this 
role. To assess a potential threat to consumer interests, a court must determine 
whether competition should govern the realm in which the defendant is ac-
cused of acting anti-competitively, and that decision will invariably involve a 
tradeoff between short-run and longer-term consumer benefits. Sometimes 
market power will be important, but not always. It simply cannot play a 
threshold role. Apparently recognizing this reality, courts analyze antitrust 
cases using the competitive makeup approach both because the Supreme 
Court has told them to and because it is the only logical way to do it.340  
                                                                                                                         
335 E.g., Polk Bros. v. Forest City, Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Antitrust 
law is designed to ensure an appropriate blend of cooperation and competition, not to 
require all economic actors to compete full tilt at every moment.”); United States v. 
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898) (“Contracts for the partial 
restraint of trade are upheld, not because they are advantageous to the individual with 
whom the contract is made, ... but because it is for the benefit of the public at large that 
they should be enforced.”).  
336 See Easterbrook, supra note 16.  
337 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 2, 5–11. 
338 See Landes & Posner, supra note 27; Easterbrook, supra note 16. 
339 Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 39. 
340 See supra Part I. 
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B. Revealing Competitive Impact Analysis Within a Rhetoric of Dichotomy 
Courts recite the rhetoric of dichotomy.341 When a judge imposes anti-
trust liability, the defendants will typically have large market shares, but 
when a court holds that the defendants did not violate the law, their shares 
will often be small. Courts understandably rely on these small shares to 
dismiss the case and truncate appellate review without articulating why 
competition was not required in the realm in which the defendant’s con-
duct was attacked. Whether the court really relied on a market power 
threshold or determined the best competitive makeup of the industry, but 
failed to articulate its reasoning, is impossible to determine. Indeed, given 
the obviousness of the result, the presiding judge may not have thought all 
that deeply about it. 
To gain insight into the analytical framework courts actually apply, 
one needs to examine the difficult cases: (1) those in which signs of mar-
ket power exist, yet the court does not impose liability and, (2) those cases 
where power appears to be lacking, yet the courts impose it. To be sure, 
courts typically recite the rhetoric of dichotomy in these cases as well.342 
A closer read, however, reveals their focus is on competitive makeup.343 
1. Market Power in Per Se Cases 
In per se cases, courts impose liability without market power, clearly 
relying on a competitive makeup analysis.344 When the agreement is na-
ked, the value of short-run competition predominates and, thus rivalry 
must govern that realm.345 Integrated agreements, however, have longer-
run benefits that may outweigh the value of short-run rivalry.346 Cases 
involving integrated agreements are thus inappropriate for per se treatment 
                                                                                                                         
341 Id. 
342 See, e.g., supra Part I. 
343 Infra Part V.B.1–2. 
344 See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348, 350–54 (1982); 
FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 428–36 (1990). Cf. Jefferson 
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9–18 (1984).  
345 See, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (1898); United 
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (“It is only after considerable 
experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se viola-
tions of the Sherman Act.”) 
346 See, e.g., Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735 (1988) 
(“[E]conomic analysis supports the view, and no precedent opposes it, that a vertical 
restraint is not illegal per se unless it includes some agreement on price or price levels.”).  
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because the court must carefully balance the short- and longer-run ben-
efits to determine the value of rivalry in each realm. 
Within the antitrust dichotomy, per se cases can only be explained as a 
curious exception in which harm supposedly occurs even though the mar-
ket power threshold is never crossed. The critic would presumably explain 
the per se rule as an administrative cost-saving device that courts use in 
cases where the defendant’s power is obvious.347 Easterbrook, however, 
did not believe that market power would be present in all per se cases. He 
thus urged courts to apply the market power screen to them.348 Also, 
scholars have recognized that in certain circumstances price fixing and 
other per se conduct can benefit consumers.349 
Even if market power was always present, the dichotomy could not 
explain why the identified pro-consumer benefits should be ignored in per 
se cases. Moreover, if the defendant’s possession of market power in these 
cases were obvious, the administrative costs of applying the rule of reason 
would be small, undermining the supposed administrative benefit.350 This 
is particularly true given that per se cases can be quite complex when 
defendants plausibly assert that their agreement was integrated in a way 
that benefitted consumers.351 
                                                                                                                         
347 ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 269 (1978) (explaining that if defend-
ants in per se cases “were allowed to prove lack of market power,” they could “intro-
duc[e] … the enormous complexities of market definition into every price-fixing case”); 
see Donald L. Beschle, ‘What, Never? Well, Hardly Ever’: Strict Antitrust Scrutiny as an 
Alternative to Per Se Antitrust Illegality, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 475 (1987) (“Judicial 
administration, it is argued, is much simpler under a per se rule, and businessmen may 
plan their activity with much greater certainty.”). 
348 Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 16–17, 39. 
349 Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and 
the Challenge of Intramarket Second–Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849, 924 (2000). 
350 Beschle, supra note 347, at 475–76 (“Arguing that types of activity can be identi-
fied as invariably anticompetitive is futile; counterexamples can almost always be put 
forward. Consequently, defenders of per se categorization are reduced to one of two 
unattractive alternatives. First, they can concede that per se categories may in some 
instances prohibit procompetitive activity, but argue that the overall benefits of per se 
categorization justify the result. Such an argument is unsatisfying because it explicitly 
sacrifices particular blameless defendants in order to search for an increase in general 
welfare. Second, per se defenders can narrow their categories to eliminate procompetitive 
counterexamples. This strategy, however, threatens to destroy those categories entirely. 
And if most of the once-condemned activity is returned to the realm of the rule of reason, 
the insight that certain types of behavior are particularly dangerous is lost.”). 
351 See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348, 337–38 
(1982) (explaining that each of the three judges on the appellate panel drew a differ-
ent conclusion as to whether the per se rule should apply and the U.S. Supreme Court 
split 6–3). 
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In any event, the Supreme Court has squarely rejected the notion that 
the per se rule condemns restraints based on a presumption of market 
power.352 In FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association,353 the D.C. 
Circuit applied the rule of reason to an agreement among criminal defense 
attorneys not to take appointments unless the city increased its fees.354 
Although naked boycotts of this type had been held illegal per se,355 the 
lower court believed that because this one involved petitioning the gov-
ernment, the FTC was required “[to] prove, and not merely presume, that 
the boycotters ha[d] market power.”356 
In overturning the D.C. Circuit’s decision and applying the per se rule, 
the Supreme Court rejected the notion “that the categorical prohibitions 
against price fixing and boycotts are merely rules of ‘administrative con-
venience’ that do not serve any substantial governmental interest unless 
the price-fixing competitors actually possess market power.”357 The Court 
held that restraints are illegal per se because they “pose[] some threat to 
the free market” and may “inflict real injury upon particular consumers or 
competitors” despite the defendants’ lack of market power.358 Liability is 
thus imposed without a market power threshold because the defendants 
restrained competition in a realm best governed by short-run rivalry. 
2. Market Power in Non-Per Se Cases 
The following cases illustrate the courts’ use of the competitive 
makeup approach in a variety of situations in which the courts recited the 
rhetoric of dichotomy. 
                                                                                                                         
352 To be sure, the Court has held that “[t]he rationale for per se rules in part is to 
avoid a burdensome inquiry into actual market conditions in situations where the likeli-
hood of anticompetitive conduct is so great as to render unjustified the costs of determin-
ing whether the particular case at bar involves anticompetitive conduct.” Jefferson Parish 
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15–16, 15 n.25 (1984). In a later case, however, 
the Court noted the import of the phrase “in part,” stressing the rule has a substantive 
component. FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 432 n.15 (1990). 
353 Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
354 Id. at 428–36. 
355 See Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). 
356 Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 429 (citing FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial 
Lawyers Ass’n, 856 F.2d 226, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).  
357 Id. at 430, 432 n.15. 
358 Id. at 434–35; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224–26 n.59 
(1940) (“[T]he fact that the group [fixing prices] cannot control the market prices does not 
necessarily mean that the agreement ... has no utility to the members of the combination. 
The effectiveness of price-fixing agreements is dependent on many factors, such as compet-
itive tactics, position in the industry, the formula underlying pricing policies.”). 
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a. Kodak Copier Case 
This case counters the critic’s argument that the Court must have con-
cluded market power exists whenever it recognizes potential liability. An 
independent service organization sued Kodak, alleging that the copier man-
ufacturer (1) unlawfully tied the purchase of spare parts for its copiers to the 
labor required for the repair and (2) attempted to monopolize the provision 
of service for its machines.359 The plaintiff did not dispute Kodak’s lack of 
power in the copier market,360 but argued that Kodak had power in the 
parts market.361 Kodak responded that even if it were the sole producer of 
parts for its own copiers, it could not raise the price profitably362 because 
competitors in the copier market would exploit Kodak’s high prices on 
parts and service to win copier sales.363 Any extra profit Kodak might earn 
on the service side would be lost on the copier side.364 
The trial court agreed, granting summary judgment after “truncated 
discovery,”365 but the Supreme Court saw the case differently.366 The 
holding had little to do with Kodak’s share of any market, barriers to en-
try, excess supply, or any other structural factor typically associated with 
the first stage of the antitrust dichotomy.367 Rather, the Court relied on two 
theories about the appropriate role of competition in the copier industry, 
holding that the plaintiff had a right to discovery into whether rivalry 
would best govern the realm of parts and service.368 
Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun cited the possibility that 
consumers would be harmed because they may (1) not have known the 
full extent of copier service costs when they bought the machine, and (2) 
have been locked into paying supra-competitive parts and service prices 
because doing so was more economical than purchasing a new copier.369 
In addition, the Court reasoned that while innovative marketing strate-
gies—such as a low upfront price with additional payments depending 
on the customer’s need for service—can be pro-competitive, one that 
                                                                                                                         
359 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 459 (1992). 
360 Id. at 466 n.10. 
361 Id. at 464. 
362 Id. at 465–66. 
363 Id. at 474 n.21. 
364 Id. at 465–67. 
365 Id. at 456. 
366 Id. at 453. 
367 Id. at 451. 
368 See id. at 503–04. 
369 Id. at 472–77. 
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involved limiting customer choice on parts and service in the copier 
industry might not be.370 
This analysis is a competitive makeup assessment. The Court instructed 
the district court to go beyond the structural arguments typically associated 
with market power and determine whether the best competitive makeup in 
the copier industry would include competition in the aftermarket for parts 
and service.371 Although the Court recited the paradigmatic rhetoric,372 
using the term market power in the context of a theoretical assessment of 
the value of rivalry in particular realms strips the concept of its traditional 
meaning. Market power cannot block the court from considering how com-
petition operates in an industry, as Easterbrook envisioned it would, if a 
court can only understand whether the defendant has power by determining 
whether competition in a particular realm best serves consumer interests, as 
the Supreme Court required the lower court to do in Kodak.373 
Both the Department of Justice’s amicus brief374 and a dissenting opin-
ion joined by three Justices made this point.375 The Court, they explained, 
had essentially held that “every maker of unique parts for its own product 
... [has] market power no matter how unimportant its product might be in 
the market.”376 Concluding that a firm concededly lacking “power” in its 
product’s market, somehow has “power” in a sub-market for spare 
parts,377 is to recognize, in Justice Scalia’s words, “a curious form of mar-
ket power”378 that extends the concept beyond where the “reasoning ... 
[justifying it] leaves off.”379 
                                                                                                                         
370 Id. at 478–79. 
371 Id. at 470 (“Even if Kodak could not raise the price of service and parts one cent with-
out losing equipment sales, that fact would not disprove market power in the aftermarkets.”). 
372 Id. at 477 (holding that “Kodak has failed to demonstrate that respondents’ infer-
ence of market power in the service and parts markets is unreasonable”). 
373 See id. at 467–70. 
374 Id. at 470 n.16 (quoting the government’s argument in its amicus brief, “[t]he 
ISOs’ claims are implausible because Kodak lacks market power in the markets for its 
copier and micrographic equipment. Buyers of such equipment regard an increase in the 
price of parts or service as an increase in the price of the equipment, and sellers recognize 
that the revenues from sales of parts and service are attributable to sales of the equipment. 
In such circumstances, it is not apparent how an equipment manufacturer such as Kodak 
could exercise power in the aftermarkets for parts and service”). 
375 Id. at 487–91 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
376 Id. at 493. 
377 Id. at 489. 
378 Id. at 493. 
379 Id. at 489. Critics may claim Kodak has been undermined by the Court’s more 
recent decision in Verizon. There, Justice Scalia wrote for the majority that “the pos-
session of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an 
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Whether the Court’s Kodak decision was correct or not, it followed a 
competitive makeup approach rather than the paradigmatic dichotomy. 
b. Rothery Storage 
In Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., the plaintiffs 
alleged that Atlas Van Lines, a moving company, and its network of small 
movers agreed to exclude from the network any mover that competed with 
Atlas.380 In a famous opinion for a D.C. Circuit panel, Judge Bork began 
by concluding “the rule of reason [could not have been] offended since 
Atlas’ market share is far too small for the restraint to threaten competi-
tion.”381 At that point, the case looked to be a straightforward application 
of the paradigm, dismissed at stage one of the dichotomy because the 
defendant lacked market power. 
Judge Bork, however, revealed the dichotomy’s falsity by what he wrote 
next. Embedded within the court’s initial conclusion that Atlas was too small 
to do harm, he recognized, was an implicit assumption about the realms of the 
moving industry that should be governed by competition.382 He acknowl-
edged what courts often leave unstated—that the best competitive makeup of 
the moving industry permitted networks to foreclose short-run competition 
from their members.383 Outside competition by affiliated carriers was not part 
of the best competitive makeup, Judge Bork explained, because “restraints 
[on outside competition could] only be intended to enhance efficiency”384 and 
                                                                                                                         
element of anticompetitive conduct.” Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis 
V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004). That language appears to signal a two-stage 
inquiry into power and then conduct. A closer look at the case, however, reveals some-
thing more is going on. The defendant in Verizon engaged in many acts that hindered 
the ability of competitors to compete in the short run and likely increased consumer 
prices. Id. at 404–05 (recognizing that respondent alleged that Verizon “filled rivals’ 
orders on a discriminatory basis as part of an anticompetitive scheme to discourage 
customers from becoming or remaining customers of competitive LECs, thus impeding 
the competitive LECs’ ability to enter and compete in the market for local telephone 
service”). Nothing in the standard dichotomy explains why those practices should have 
been permitted. To conclude that the challenged conduct was not “anticompetitive,” the 
Court had to determine the best competitive makeup of the telecom industry did not 
require rivalry in the realms that the defendant foreclosed. 
380 792 F.2d 210, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
381 Id. at 214. “Analysis might begin and end with the observation that Atlas and its 
agents command between 5.1 and 6% of the relevant market, which is the interstate 
carriage of used household goods.” Id. at 217. 
382 Id. at 214. 
383 See id. at 223–27. 
384 Id. at 229 n.11. 
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could not “have been intended to” harm consumers.385 By ultimately conflat-
ing the inquiry into consumer harm with the court’s market power analysis, 
Judge Bork effectively recognized that the two are part of a unitary competi-
tive makeup inquiry.386 
c. Staples–Office Depot Merger 
In FTC v. Staples, Inc.,387 the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia followed a similar path, enjoining the merger between Staples 
and Office Depot.388 It shoehorned the case into the paradigmatic rubric by 
defining the market as “office supply superstores,” a market in which the 
court could infer the merged firm would have power based on its large 
share.389 As in Kodak, however, this was a curious form of market power. 
The court recognized that lots of stores sold office supplies and were easi-
ly accessible to businesses large and small.390 And like Judge Bork, the 
court did not simply rely on its structural market analysis. It explained 
quite carefully how anticompetitive effects would flow from the merger 
despite the apparently competitive options.391 
Once again, the court’s analysis fits more comfortably within the 
framework of determining the best competitive makeup. In the office 
supply industry, the court held, short-run rivalry should govern the realm 
that included office superstores.392 To force that conclusion into the para-
digmatic dichotomy is either (1) to deny the reasoning process through 
which the court actually decided to block the merger, or (2) to strip the 
market power concept of the attributes that it needs to play the threshold 
role that the antitrust dichotomy requires it to play. 
                                                                                                                         
385 Id. at 214. 
386 Id. at 230 n.11 (stating that “[a]ntitrust adjudication has always proceeded through 
inferences about market power drawn from market shares” without citing a single Su-
preme Court case in support). 
387 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
388 See infra notes 393–96 and accompanying text. See generally Staples, 970 F. 
Supp. 1066. 
389 Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1074–82 (defining the relevant product market as office 
superstores). 
390 Id. at 1078. 
391 Id. at 1081–86, 1082 nn.13, 14 (determining that the merger would have anticom-
petitive effect). 
392 See id. at 1083–86. 
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d. Lundbeck 
A drug company, Lundbeck, Inc., acquired the only two drug treat-
ments for a potentially life-threatening heart condition afflicting premature 
infants.393 First, it acquired Indocin IV, the only drug treatment then on the 
market and immediately increased the price by 40 percent.394 Shortly 
thereafter, it acquired another drug, NeoProfen,395 that upon Food & Drug 
Administration (FDA) approval would become the second available treat-
ment.396 Within days of the second acquisition, the drug company in-
creased Indocin IV’s price 1,278 percent.397 Four months later, the FDA, 
as expected, approved NeoProfen,398 and the drug company priced it just a 
few dollars below Indocin.399 
The FTC sued, alleging that the defendant violated the antitrust laws 
by acquiring the second drug.400 The structural evidence of market power 
was overwhelming. The defendant owned the only two drug treatments, 
both of which were effective 75–90 percent of the time.401 The FDA ex-
plicitly rejected labeling that would have allowed NeoProfen to claim 
superiority to Indocin, thus recognizing the two were interchangeable.402 
Also, if there were any doubt, the defendant’s internal documents con-
firmed the drugs were substitutes.403 Lundbeck purchased NeoProfen so it 
                                                                                                                         
393 FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236, 1238 (8th Cir. 2011); FTC v. Lundbeck, 
Inc., Civil Nos. 08–6379 (JNE/JJG), 08–6381 (JNE/JJG), 2010 WL 3810015, at *4–5 (D. 
Minn. Aug. 31, 2010). 
394 Lundbeck, 2010 WL 3810015, at *6. 
395 Id. at *5. 
396 This transaction was too small to require mandatory reporting to the antitrust en-
forcement agencies. Minnesota v. Ovation Pharms., Inc., 2008 WL 5347144 ¶ 22 (D. 
Minn.) (Complaint) (“The size of the NeoProfen transaction fell below the regulatory 
threshold for reporting acquisitions to the federal antitrust agencies.”). 
397 Lundbeck, 2010 WL 3810015, at *8. 
398 Id. at *2–3. 
399 Id. at *8–9. 
400 Id. at *1; Complaint ¶¶ 6–7, Minnesota v. Ovation Pharms., Inc., No. 08CV06379, 
2008 WL 5347143 (D. Minn. Dec. 16, 2008) (No. 08-06381). 
401 FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., Civil Nos. 08–6379 (JNE/JJG), 08–6381 (JNE/JJG), 2010 
WL 3810015, at *4 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2010). 
402 Id. at *3. 
403 Lundbeck, 2010 WL 3810015, at *10–11 (finding the defendant’s internal docu-
ments showed that the company believed that “NeoProfen will capture a significant 
portion of the pharmaceutical PDA market at the expense of Indocin IV” and “base case 
Indocin IV forecast assumed volume and sales loss due to new competition (generic entry 
and NeoProfen). Based on NeoProfen diligence completed to date and associated analy-
sis, we have confirmed our deal model sales projections and the expected sales loss.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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could “cannibalize [its] Indocin IV sales in a controlled manner” and “re-
alize a more stable revenue stream for both products.”404 Finally, the de-
fendant trained its sales staff to convince hospitals to switch from Indocin, 
which was about to face generic competition, to NeoProfen, which had 
continued patent protection.405 To assist its sales staff in this effort, the 
defendant set NeoProfen’s price at a percentage discount below Indocin 
IV to, internal documents stated, take “away potential pharmacoeconomic 
debate” and allow sales representatives to focus on product differentiation 
without “spending time with the pharmacy director on price.”406 
A trial court implementing the standard antitrust dichotomy would see 
an easy decision: the relevant market consisted of drugs treating heart 
defects in premature infants, and the defendant had market power because 
it owned the only two. As if that were not enough, the defendant had in-
creased the price more than ten-fold only after acquiring the second drug. 
A relevant market containing both drugs would have seemed obvious. 
The district court, however, did not implement the antitrust dichotomy. 
It considered the value of competition within particular realms of the drug 
industry.407 At trial, the parties offered conflicting testimony as to whether 
doctors considered price in choosing between the two drugs.408 The district 
court, however, did not implement the antitrust dichotomy. It considered the 
value of competition within particular realms of the drug industry.409 At 
trial, the parties offered conflicting testimony as to whether doctors consid-
ered price in choosing between the two drugs.410 Latching onto that testi-
mony, the court “found” doctors would not consider price and thus (1) the 
two drugs were in separate markets and thus (2) the acquisition of the se-
cond drug did not create market power.411 Viewed through the standard 
paradigm, the decision appears inexplicable. Even if doctors were the sole 
                                                                                                                         
404 Id. at *11, *13 (referring to market shares based on a PDA market). 
405 Id. at *12–13. 
406 Id. at *11. 
407 Id. at *19–22.  
408 Id. at *14–19 (for example Dr. Mark Mammel, a neonatologist in St. Paul Minne-
sota testified that he “would feel comfortable treating the vast majority of his patients 
with either NeoProfen or Indocin IV,” but “[w]hen deciding between two possible treat-
ments, [he] chooses the one that is safer, if he is persuaded that one is indeed safer. He 
makes that decision without regard to cost”); id. at *21 (the court also cited evidence that 
Bedford Laboratories—which had obtained FDA approval for a generic version of Indo-
cin—did not forecast any impact of generic Indocin IV on NeoProfen). 
409 Id. at *29–30. 
410 Id. at *20–21. 
411 Id. at *21. 
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decision-makers—which they were not—those doctors would be influenced 
by the quality of the two drugs, a basis of competition as legitimate as price. 
One can understand—if not agree with—the court’s decision  under 
the best competitive makeup approach. In its answer to the FTC’s com-
plaint, the defendant characterized the competitive makeup of the market 
in the following way: 
The group of patients for whom the drugs even theoretically may be ac-
ceptable clinical substitutes is small, such that a profit maximizing sup-
plier of either drug would not alter prices across all sales in competitive 
response to a price change by the other. Further, that already small theo-
retical population will decline as more doctors turn to the safer drug and 
migrate to NeoProfen, and those doctors who want to use indomethacin, 
for whatever clinical reason, have the option of a generic indomethacin.412 
The court apparently agreed the drug industry did not require rivalry 
on price.413 Doctors prescribe drugs, the court believed, in the best inter-
ests of the patient’s health.414 The short-run benefit of price rivalry was 
thus small. Competition had much more value in regulating longer-run 
competition to invent new and improved drug treatments, and rivalry in 
the innovation realm would be stimulated by permitting drug makers to 
extract significant profit from their sale of approved drugs, as the defend-
ant had done.415 
The district court thus appears to have determined the best competitive 
makeup of the industry did not require rivalry on price or short-run quali-
ty.416 Whether the court correctly decided this case is a complicated ques-
tion that should have been open to de novo review. By ostensibly resting 
its decision on stage one of the dichotomy, however, the court effectively 
isolated that decision from meaningful appellate review. This is the real 
problem to which this Article now turns. 
                                                                                                                         
412 Answer of Defendant Ovation Pharm., Inc., FTC v. Lundbeck, Civil No. 08-6379 
(JNE/JJG), 08-6381 (JNE/JJG), 2009 WL 407279 (D. Minn. Jan. 13, 2009) (No. 08-
06379 (JNE/JJG)). 
413 See FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., Civil Nos. 08-6379 (JNE/JJG), 08-6381 (JNE/JJG), 
2010 WL 3810015 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2010). 
414 Id. at *14. 
415 Cf. Cont’l Orthopedic Appliances v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y., Inc., 40 F. 
Supp. 2d 109, 118–20 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (recognizing possibility that best competitive 
makeup of insurance market could require competition for HMO patients separate from 
all health insurance customers); Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. May Dept. Stores Co., 881 F. 
Supp. 860, 868–69 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (recognizing that competitive makeup of retail 
markets required competition among department stores separate from all retail). 
416 See generally Lundbeck, 2010 WL 3810015. 
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VI. DE NOVO REVIEW OF ALL ANTITRUST ISSUES 
In developing definitions of a market, courts do not assess market power 
directly by observing real world facts. They instead engage in a creative 
process to determine the best competitive makeup of the relevant indus-
try.417 After conducting this analysis, however, the trial judge translates its 
results into the antitrust dichotomy’s terms, arbitrarily framing it as either: 
(1) a stage one market power determination limiting appellate review or (2) 
a stage two competitive effects assessment subject to plenary review. A trial 
judge should be able to think creatively about how competition operates in 
the industry before it, as the judge did in FTC v. Lundbeck.418 Given the im-
portance of antitrust cases to the economy, however, a district court should 
not have the power to dictate the level of appellate scrutiny that its decision 
will receive as a result of its classification within the antitrust dichotomy. 
If the Lundbeck court had held that the effect of the defendant’s acqui-
sitions and pricing decisions did not harm consumers because longer-run 
innovation competition is more beneficial than short-run price or quality 
competition, that decision would have been reviewable de novo. Because 
the judge held the two drugs were in different markets, however, the deci-
sion could be stricken down only if it were clearly erroneous.419 Since 
there is no meaningful difference in the reasoning process that a trial court 
would use to reach either of these decisions, an appellate court should 
apply the same level of scrutiny in both cases. Additionally, because anti-
trust cases are both complex and important to wide segments of society, 
that review should be plenary. 
Using a de novo standard to review all antitrust questions would be 
consistent with the federal courts’ existing practice of rigorously scrutiniz-
ing on appeal fact intensive issues with widespread social and economic 
impact.420 This Part first illustrates the harm caused by deferential review 
                                                                                                                         
417 See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text. 
418 See, e.g., Lundbeck, 2010 WL 3810015, at *21. 
419 Similarly, if the trial court had ruled Alcoa lacked market power because recycled 
aluminum was in the market and thus Alcoa’s share was too small, appellate review 
would have been limited by the clearly erroneous standard. If instead, the trial court 
decided that the effect of Alcoa’s conduct with respect to virgin ingot harmed consumers, 
an appellate court would conduct de novo review. See generally Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d 
Cir. 1945).  
420 See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 
513–14 (1984) (actual malice standard subject to de novo review even though it consists 
of a fact finding about an individual’s state of mind); cf. Steven Semeraro, Responsibility 
in Capital Sentencing, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 140–45 (2002) (arguing that Supreme 
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of market structure questions under current antitrust law. It then reviews 
numerous constitutional and statutory questions that the courts review de 
novo despite the significant fact-finding that underlies the trial court’s 
decision. Finally, this Part shows antitrust liability questions are similar to 
those that the Court has chosen to scrutinize carefully. 
A. Lundbeck as an Illustration of the Danger of Clearly Erroneous Review 
The FTC appealed the Lundbeck case to the Eighth Circuit, arguing 
that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard.421 By looking to 
doctors, rather than hospitals or patients, and by ignoring marginal con-
sumers and internal business strategy documents showing that the defend-
ant itself viewed the two drugs as direct competitors, the Commission 
contended, the trial court erred in holding at stage one of the dichotomy 
that the two drugs were not in the same market.422 
The Eighth Circuit panel acknowledged the persuasiveness of the 
FTC’s argument, but found itself constrained by the clearly erroneous 
standard.423 The defendant’s strategy to promote NeoProfen over Indocin 
IV, the court reasoned, could “be interpreted to mean that while Indocin 
IV was vulnerable to generics, NeoProfen was not, and thus the products 
are not interchangeable.”424 Where two interpretations of the evidence are 
plausible, the court held, “the factfinder’s choice between them is not 
clearly erroneous.”425 
The evidence showed some level of substitutability between the drugs, 
and thus the conclusion that they were in different markets was a discretion-
ary one turning on the trial judge’s view of the best competitive makeup of 
the drug industry. The panel signaled that it might have decided the case 
differently were it open to plenary review.426 Judge Kopf, a district judge 
sitting by designation, wrote a concurrence describing the lower court’s 
heavy reliance on the doctors’ testimony as “perplexing.”427 Doctors, Judge 
Kopf recognized, had no incentive to rely on the economic factors that drive 
antitrust analysis.428 “That oddity seems especially strange,” he explained, 
                                                                                                                         
Court’s practice of subjecting many findings of constitutional fact to probing review 
justified similar review of the ultimate question in death penalty cases). 
421 FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236, 1239 (8th Cir. 2011). 
422 Id. 
423 Id. at 1242–43. 
424 Id. at 1242. 
425 Id. 
426 Id. at 1243 (“Whether this court would come to the same conclusion is irrelevant.”). 
427 Id. (Kopf, J., concurring). 
428 Id. 
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“where, as here, there is no real dispute that (1) both drugs are effective 
when used to treat the illness about which the doctors testified and (2) inter-
nal records from the defendant raise an odor of predation.”429 He concurred 
in the panel opinion, however, because “the standard of review carries the 
day in this case as it does in so many others.”430 
B. Policy Drives the Standard of Review 
Outside the antitrust context, the federal courts decide whether to treat a 
finding as one of fact, subject to deferential review, or one of law, subject to 
plenary review, by examining the role of appellate review in the substantive 
area of law, rather than the inherent nature of the question.431 Many issues 
bearing all of the earmarks of findings of fact are reviewed by appellate 
courts de novo. At common law, for example, the issue of whether probable 
cause existed to prosecute a case was a question of law, even though it 
clearly required the court to make findings about the information available 
to the entity filing the case.432 Under modern law, the Supreme Court has 
adopted a de novo standard for factual questions in cases dealing with key 
clauses of the First,433 Fourth,434 Fifth,435 Sixth,436 Eighth,437 and Fourteenth 
                                                                                                                         
429 Id. 
430 Id. (emphasis added). Appellate courts have upheld trial court decisions as not clearly 
erroneous despite apparent doubt about the result. See, e.g., California v. Am. Stores Co., 
872 F.2d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Were we to evaluate independently the evidence of the 
relevant product market, we might reach a different conclusion.”); SmithKline Corp. v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1065 (3d Cir. 1978) (rejecting defendant’s attempt to show that 
district court finding of sub-market in certain types of antibiotics was clearly erroneous). 
431 Some commentators have argued the distinction between questions of law and fact 
is incoherent. See JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF 
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 55 (1927); LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 270 (1930); 
LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 546–48 (1965).  
432 George C. Christie, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 
14, 17 (1992). 
433 See infra Parts VI.B.1.a–VI.B.1.b. 
434 See infra Part VI.B.1.c. 
435 Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 107–09 (1995) (holding the in custody re-
quirement of the Miranda rule is subject to de novo review). 
436 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984) (holding reasonableness of 
counsel subject to de novo review); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 341–42 (1980) 
(holding potential conflict of interest from multiple representation subject to de novo 
review); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 397 n.4, 403–04 (1977) (holding waiver of 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel subject to de novo review). 
437 See infra Part VI.B.1.c. 
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Amendments.438 And some federal appellate courts have similarly reviewed 
factual questions de novo under important statutory schemes.439 
This subsection describes the issues appellate courts review de novo 
and compares them to the market definition and market power questions in 
antitrust cases. It concludes that nothing compels the courts to use a defer-
ential standard to review market definition findings under stage one of the 
antitrust dichotomy. On the contrary, many of the issues appellate courts 
now review de novo require judges to implement intensely factual, vague-
ly worded standards designed to safeguard important social values. The 
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Unreasonable Search 
Clause of the Fourth are two examples. The high stakes in antitrust cases, 
in terms of both the availability of treble damages and attorney’s fees,440 
the impact on the broader economy, and the need for creativity in deter-
mining the best competitive makeup of an industry, make the case for de 
novo review of all antitrust issues, if anything, stronger. 
1. Constitutional Issues 
The following sub-sections review areas of constitutional law in which 
the Supreme Court requires de novo review of fact findings. 
a. Obscenity 
In the late 1950s, the Court held speech that (1) appeals to a prurient in-
terest, (2) is patently offensive, and (3) lacks social value, is obscene and 
may thus be suppressed.441 The Court noted the importance of the role of 
                                                                                                                         
438 See infra Part VI.B.1.e (due process implications of punitive damages); Sumner v. 
Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597 (1982) (per curiam) (holding sufficiency of pre-trial identifica-
tion procedures subject to de novo review). 
Constitutional issues on which appellate courts are not required to conduct an independ-
ent review of key fact findings are those in which the trial judge has unique access to evi-
dence necessary to make critical credibility determinations. See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467 
U.S. 1025, 1036 (1984) (juror impartiality); Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 117 (1983) 
(per curiam) (competency to stand trial). Trial judges in antitrust cases do not have unique 
access to the information needed to assess the competitive makeup of an industry. They 
obviously rely on evidence provided by the parties and the testimony of experts. 
439 See infra Part VI.B.2. 
440 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15(a) (West 2014).   
441 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-87 (1957). The Court later refined the 
test in Miller v. California, declaring that: 
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether ‘the aver-
age person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find 
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) 
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the jury in these proceedings,442 thus deemphasizing the role of appellate 
courts. If the trial court followed the correct procedure, the finder of fact would 
have the last word, subject to deferential sufficiency of the evidence review.443 
Justice Harlan wrote a separate opinion, criticizing this approach. The 
constitutional issue, he wrote was “not really an issue of fact but a ques-
tion of constitutional judgment of the most sensitive and delicate kind.”444 
Every case involving the suppression of speech “has an individuality and 
‘value’ of its own.”445 But that uniqueness, Harlan reasoned, weighed in 
favor of heightened review, not deference: “a reviewing court must deter-
mine for itself whether the attacked expression is suppressible within con-
stitutional standards. Since those standards do not readily lend themselves 
to generalized definitions, the constitutional problem in the last analysis 
becomes one of particularized judgments which appellate courts must 
make for themselves.”446  
Within a few years, the Court came to agree with Justice Harlan that 
appellate courts could not rely “on a ‘sufficient evidence’ standard of 
review,” but must instead review the decision de novo.447 Even after re-
formulating the test to reference local community standards,448 the Court 
reiterated that appellate courts were required to conduct probing review.449 
Requiring a trier of fact to decide an obscenity case in accordance with its 
own understanding of the tolerance of the average person in their commu-
nity, the Court explained, “does not mean ... that obscenity convictions 
                                                                                                                         
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sex-
ual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) 
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, polit-
ical, or scientific value. 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (internal citations omitted). 
442 Roth, 354 U.S. at 489–91; see also Miller, 413 U.S. at 33–34 (“As the Court made 
clear in Mishkin v. New York, the primary concern with requiring a jury to apply the 
standard of ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards' is to be 
certain that, so far as material is not aimed at a deviant group, it will be judged by its 
impact on an average person, rather than a particularly susceptible or sensitive person—
or indeed a totally insensitive one.” (citations omitted)). 
443 Roth, 354 U.S. at 476. 
444 Id. at 498 (Harlan, J., concurring in result and dissenting). 
445 Id. at 497. 
446 Id. 
447 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190 n.6 (1964) (per Brennan, J.) (“[T]his 
Court cannot avoid making an independent constitutional judgment on the facts of the 
case as to whether the material involved is constitutionally protected.”). 
448 Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 302–03 (1977). 
449 Id. at 305. 
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will be virtually unreviewable.”450 On the contrary, the Court held that 
“[t]he type of conduct depicted must fall within the substantive limitations 
suggested” by the Court, and appellate courts had a responsibility to en-
sure the preservation of constitutional values.451 
b. Libel 
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court again adopted an impre-
cise standard that asked the judge or jury to find facts based on an under-
standing of human nature.452 The Free Speech Clause was held to require 
that a public figure in a libel case prove the defendant acted with actual 
malice, i.e., purposely published a false statement or exhibited a reckless 
disregard for the truth.453 As in the obscenity cases, the Court imposed a 
duty on appellate courts to independently examine the record.454 
The Court’s reasoning mirrored that in the obscenity cases. It held this 
“rule of independent review assigns to judges a constitutional responsibility 
that cannot be delegated to the trier of fact.”455 This rule, the Court ex-
plained, “reflects a deeply held conviction that judges ... must exercise such 
review in order to preserve the precious liberties established and ordained 
by the Constitution.”456 Also, this is particularly true where the substantive 
standard is “not readily captured in ‘one infallible definition.’”457 
c. Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion 
Before police officers may stop and frisk an individual, the Fourth 
Amendment requires that they must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion 
                                                                                                                         
450 Id. (“[Applying] community standards does not mean, however, that juror discre-
tion in this area is to go unchecked.”). 
451 Id. For example, in Jenkins v. Georgia, the Court unanimously rejected the argu-
ment that, under Miller, once the jury resolved the obscenity question, the job of the 
appellate court was merely to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support 
it. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 159–60 (1974). Justice Rehnquist, writing for the 
Court, explained that appellate courts retained “the ultimate power ... to conduct an 
independent review of constitutional claims when necessary” to preserve First Amend-
ment values. Id. at 160. See also Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 503 (1987); Hamling v. 
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 124 (1974). 
452 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
453 Id. at 279–80. 
454 Id. at 284–85 (citing Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963)). 
455 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984). See 
Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989) (“Judges, as expositors 
of the Constitution, have a duty to independently decide whether the evidence in the record is 
sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
456 Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 510–11. 
457 Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc., 491 U.S. at 686. 
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that crime is afoot.458 In order to conduct a full-scale search, the officer 
must have probable cause to believe evidence of criminal activity will be 
found in the place to be searched.459 In considering the appropriate stand-
ard of review, the Court explained that “[a]rticulating precisely what ‘rea-
sonable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause’ mean is not possible. They are 
commonsense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with ‘the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent 
men, not legal technicians, act.’”460 
The Court distinguished these sorts of legal standards from more pre-
cise concepts such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt where greater 
deference is appropriate.461 “[F]luid concepts” like probable cause, the 
Court explained, “take their substantive content from the particular con-
texts in which the standards are being assessed,”462 and as a result, one 
case will seldom serve as precedent for another.463 An appellate court must 
therefore review the trial judge’s decision de novo in order to protect 
Fourth Amendment values.464 
d. Excessive Fines 
The Constitution prohibits a government-imposed fine that is “grossly 
disproportional to the gravity of [a defendant’s] offense.”465 This standard 
is similar in its lack of precision and its reference to communal values to 
the standards applied in other constitutional cases.466 Not surprisingly, the 
Court required de novo appellate review.467 
e. Punitive Damages 
Historically, civil juries had unfettered discretion to impose punitive 
damages. In the early 1990s, however, the Court held that the Due Process 
Clause limited their use.468 Punitive damages, the Court held, could not be 
                                                                                                                         
458 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 
459 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235–36 (1983). 
460 Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996). 
461 Id. at 696. 
462 Id. 
463 Id. at 698. 
464 Id. at 691. 
465 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998). 
466 Id. at 336 (describing standard as “inherently imprecise”). 
467 Id. at 336 n.10, 337–44. 
468 Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
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grossly excessive with respect to the defendant’s conduct,469 and it re-
quired de novo review of that fact-intensive question.470 
2. Statutory Issues 
Lower courts have also applied de novo review to discretionary fact-
intensive questions under important statutory schemes that, like the antitrust 
laws, have significant economic impact.471 For example, the economic 
substance doctrine holds a transaction formally satisfying a provision of 
the tax code may nonetheless be deemed improper if it has no economic 
substance separate from tax avoidance.472 Also, in trademark infringement 
cases, liability turns on whether an unauthorized use of the mark in com-
merce creates a likelihood of confusion.473 Although both of these issues 
are fact intensive, at least three circuits—and perhaps as many as seven—
review economic substance questions de novo474 and several circuits simi-
larly apply plenary review to the likelihood of confusion issue.475 
                                                                                                                         
469 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Al-
liance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453–55 (1993) (plurality opinion). 
470 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 532 U.S. 424, 431 (2001). 
471 See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. United States, 326 F.3d 737, 741 (6th Cir. 2003). 
472 Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5, 9 (2000). 
473 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (West 2014). 
474 See, e.g., Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(holding that “[t]he ultimate conclusion as to business purpose is a legal conclusion, which 
we review without deference”); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 435 F.3d 594, 599 (6th 
Cir. 2006) (same); James v. Comm’r, 899 F.2d 905, 909 (10th Cir. 1990) (same). Four 
circuits have decisions going both ways or appear undecided. Compare Estate of Strangi v. 
Comm’r, 293 F.3d 279, 281 (5th Cir. 2002) (reviewing under “clear error” standard), Har-
bor Bancorp & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 115 F.3d 722, 727 (9th Cir. 1997) (same), Karr v. 
Comm’r, 924 F.2d 1018, 1023 (11th Cir. 1991) (same), and Massengill v. Comm’r, 876 
F.2d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 1989) (same), with Compaq Computer Corp. & Subsidiaries v. 
Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 780–81 (5th Cir. 2001) (reviewed de novo), IES Indus., Inc. v. 
United States, 253 F.3d 350, 351 (8th Cir. 2001) (same), United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1017 (11th Cir. 2001), and Sacks v. Comm’r, 69 F.3d 982, 986 
(9th Cir. 1995) (same). Five other circuits have applied deferential review. Black & Decker 
Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 441 (4th Cir. 2006); Nicole Rose Corp. v. Comm’r, 
320 F.3d 282, 284 (2d Cir. 2002); ASA Investerings P’ship v. Comm’r, 201 F.3d 505, 511 
(D.C. Cir. 2000); ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 245 (3d Cir. 1998); N. Ind. Pub. 
Serv. Co. v. Comm’r, 115 F.3d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 1997). 
475 McMonagle v. Ne. Women’s Ctr., Inc., 493 U.S. 901, 904 (1989) (White, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari); Elby’s Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc. v. Frisch’s Rests., 
Inc., 459 U.S. 916, 917 (1982) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citing 
Ninth and Second Circuit cases applying de novo review). 
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C. Comparing Antitrust Issues to Those That Courts Review De Novo 
The line of cases described above contains two common elements. 
First, each involves an issue of significant public importance. Some deal 
with fundamental rights, such as free speech,476 others involve important 
economic issues, including punitive damages,477 excessive fines,478 and 
the likelihood of confusion in trademark cases.479 
Second, in these cases, the appellate courts have been unable to devise 
clear rules that would definitively resolve most disputes. Instead, the court 
must apply situation-specific standards that are imbued with meaning by 
the way courts apply them, rather than by the terms used to describe them. 
“[T]he content of the rule,” the Court has explained, “is not revealed simp-
ly by its literal text, but rather is given meaning through the evolutionary 
process of common-law adjudication.”480 The concepts in these cases are 
“fluid” and “cannot be articulated with precision,”481 and independent 
appellate review ensures the appellate courts “maintain control of, and [are 
able] to clarify, the legal principles.”482 At its root, probing appellate re-
view of important fact intensive issues “‘assure[s] the uniform general 
treatment of similarly situated persons that is the essence of law itself.’”483 
These rationales for heightened review apply with full force to antitrust 
cases. To be sure, competition is not a fundamental right.484 The Supreme 
Court, however, has recognized the antitrust laws’ pseudo-constitutional 
status, describing them as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise[,] as im-
portant to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise 
                                                                                                                         
476 See supra Parts VI.B.1.a–VI.B.1.b. 
477 See supra Part VI.B.1.e. 
478 See supra Part VI.B.1.d. 
479 See supra Part VI.B.2. 
480 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502 (1984); 
Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686 (1989) (“[O]nly 
through the course of case-by-case adjudication can we give content to these otherwise 
elusive constitutional standards.”). 
481 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001).  
482 Id.; Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996); see Thompson v. Keo-
hane, 516 U.S. 99, 115 (1995) (“[T]he law declaration aspect of independent review 
potentially may guide police, unify precedent, and stabilize the law.”). 
483 Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 436 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concur-
ring)). The Court has echoed Justice Harlan’s more general concern expressed in an early 
obscenity case that “the constitutional values protected ... make it imperative that judges 
... make sure that it is correctly applied.” Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 502; see Harte-Hanks 
Commc’ns, 491 U.S. at 686 (“[O]nly through the course of case-by-case adjudication can 
we give content to these otherwise elusive constitutional standards.”). 
484 See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
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system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal 
freedoms.”485 Antitrust plaintiffs can obtain treble damages and attorney’s 
fees,486 directly mirroring the justification for applying de novo review in 
excessive fines and punitive damages cases. Additionally, the broad im-
pact of antitrust decisions on the economy makes these cases of wide-
spread public importance. 
Antitrust issues are also extremely fluid in the way that has led the Su-
preme Court in other areas to require de novo review. The trier-of-fact 
must determine whether relevant facts fit within the scope of an imprecise 
judge-made substantive rule that draws on values and interpretations that 
extend beyond credibility and right or wrong decisions. The metes and 
bounds of efficient competition will vary from industry to industry and 
thus case to case. The “literal text” of judge-made antitrust rules, much 
less the statutory language, reveals virtually none of the law’s content. All 
of its meaning comes through the evolutionary process of common-law 
adjudication. As the Supreme Court explained in an early antitrust case:  
[T]he application of the rules of decision in ... each case arising under 
the [antitrust laws] must be determined upon the particular facts dis-
closed by the record, and that the opinions in those cases must be read 
in the light ... of a clear recognition of the essential differences in the 
facts of those cases, and in the facts of any new case to which the rule 
of earlier decisions is to be applied.487 
Antitrust issues and those to which the courts now apply de novo review 
are thus indistinguishable. 
CONCLUSION 
Nothing approaching antitrust’s dichotomous analytic paradigm is 
true. Market definition is creative, not observational, and the ostensibly 
separate inquiries into market power and competitive effects are really a 
single endeavor designed to determine conceptually the industry’s best 
competitive makeup. Although that term of art is foreign to the antitrust 
vocabulary, it captures actual antitrust practice in the courts. Everybody 
knows pure competition is a fiction; all industries involve an amalgam of 
competitive and cooperative realms. Antitrust requires competition in 
                                                                                                                         
485 United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
486 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (West 2014) (providing that “any person who shall 
be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust 
laws may sue ... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of 
suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee”). 
487 Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass’n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 579 (1925). 
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those realms where it serves consumer interests, and the case law supports 
the conclusion that courts use the best competitive makeup approach to 
determine when the law requires rivalry. 
Antitrust thus has an artificial heart. The paradigm supposedly guiding 
it is false. As Kaplow illustrates, the rhetoric of market definition is a 
sham in the sense that courts do not observe consumer behavior and dis-
cover markets. But so is the rhetoric of market power.488 Knowing that a 
defendant has the ability to raise price profitably is just a small piece of 
the potentially relevant information necessary to resolve an antitrust case. 
Where Kaplow’s project was unabashedly “destructive,”489 the goal 
here is revelatory. That is, to show that courts decide antitrust cases 
through a process of determining the best competitive makeup of an indus-
try. Grappling with the interactions between competitive realms, coopera-
tive realms, and those isolated from competition is a challenging task. One 
might question whether courts are capable of handling it. It would certain-
ly be conceivable to imagine an antitrust regime governed by bright-line, 
prophylactic rules. That regime, however, would differ from the one we 
have,490 and Austrian economics provides a theoretical justification for 
concluding that thoughtful judges can do a better job of resolving antitrust 
issues than would mindless, automaton courts applying necessarily over- 
and under-inclusive bright-line, prophylactic rules. 
More important, the Supreme Court has to date, including its most re-
cent 2013 decision, demanded that federal district judges engage theory 
and make thoughtful antitrust decisions.491 To be sure, courts ostensibly 
continue to recite the rhetoric of the antitrust dichotomy. That process, 
however, may enable them to determine an industry’s best competitive 
makeup more effectively than a “just look at everything” approach would. 
Although much of this Article is interpretive, attempting to explain 
what courts actually do when they say they are defining markets, the final 
Part offers a specific prescriptive proposal. Appellate courts should aban-
don the clearly erroneous standard of review with regard to market defini-
tion. The Supreme Court requires independent appellate scrutiny of fact-
findings controlling important issues of public policy that are indistin-
guishable from the antitrust laws. It would thus be a small, but important, 
step to require de novo review of all antitrust issues. 
                                                                                                                         
488 Kaplow, supra note 9, at 466.  
489 Id.  
490 See Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 615, 641 (2000) (“The prominence of the rule of reason ... reflects a gradual 
consensus within the judiciary and also the academy that, when it comes to analyzing 
market structure, courts can be trusted with at least some degree of discretion.”). 
491 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013). 
